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The Arctic Council has a robust history of fostering cooperation among its members on a 
host of environmental and scientific objectives. Yet, as the region has warmed the formerly 
inaccessible region has become ever easier to access, and Arctic politics are becoming of greater 
interest to the global community. In the midst significant change of this the network created by 
the Arctic Council continues to advance its cooperative agenda, though increasingly it seems to 
be experiencing setbacks due to the surges of nationalistic rhetoric on the part of its members. 
What best explains the transformation of national attitudes and how will such a transformation 
affect the future of Arctic politics? This paper argues the national identities of Arctic states limits 
the ability of the Arctic Council to create policy inroads into the national interests of its members 
in key identity-linked areas such as national defense, resource extraction, and territorial disputes. 
This propagates a normalization of Arctic politics, shifting the formerly unique hyperborean 
political system into something more readily resembling the interactions of Arctic states below 
the Arctic Circle. This is accomplished through a histographical analysis of Arctic Council 
policy recommendations, domestic political developments, and international relationships since 
1989 between the Arctic Council and the two most nationalistic Arctic states, Russia and 
Canada. Ultimately, Arctic Council recommendations on issues linked to traditionally 




integration into member states; however, closely related to power national interests are neglected 
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For nearly the whole of human history, the Arctic has lain as a frigid realm nearly 
impervious to most Ocean-going traffic. However, for the first time in human history that is 
changing. Climate change has begun to cause climate of the Polar Regions to warm, shrinking 
the sea ice serving as the primary impediment to travel at the poles, and states from all over the 
world first began to take action to study, mitigate, and ultimately prevent these kinds of regional 
transformation over thirty years ago.1 After the discovery in the hole of the ozone layer above 
Antarctica, the international community rallied together to limit the production of CFCs and to 
prevent further harm to the Ozone Layer.2 This effort culminated in the Montreal Protocol of 
1989, cementing the efforts of the international community into a legally binding document. 
Though this work proved monumental in solving a problem for the whole of the global 
community, it also served to highlight a lack of action done to address ongoing problems and a 
lack of study of the unique Arctic environment much closer to home for several of the signatories 
of the Montreal Protocol. To this end, a series of international research agreements, cooperative 
arrangements, and collective effort created the Arctic Council.3  
Today, the Arctic Council serves as the most prominent and important regional institution 
for Arctic issues, creating new habits of interaction among its members on topics such as human 
development, environmental management, scientific coordination, sustainable economic 
                                                      
1 C. Keskitalo, "International Region-Building - Development of the Arctic as an International Region," 
Cooperation and Conflict 42, no. 2 (2007). 190 
2 United Nations Ozone Secretariat, "Handbook for the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone 
Layer," ed. United Nations Environment Programme (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Ozone Secretariat, 2018). 
3 S. Knecht, "The Politics of Arctic International Cooperation: Introducing a Dataset on Stakeholder Participation in 




development, and search and rescue operations.4 The most prominent acclaim the Arctic Council 
has to offer though comes in the form of its climate research, reports like the Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment of 2004 and its later successor reports paint a picture of an Arctic continuing 
to warm with melting sea ice opening the region for commercial traffic and other economic 
activity.5 The publication of these reports has done more than highlight the ongoing issues of the 
Arctic region related to climate change though; those reports have served to reignite the 
discourse of the Arctic in every major Arctic state.  
While the precipitation of discussions on the Arctic is important for the study and 
preservation of the Arctic climate, the Arctic represents a politicized region in the national 
identity in nearly every Arctic Coastal states fueling several of the ongoing Arctic Coastal state 
territorial disputes. Moreover, the national ideas on the Arctic range from a kind of manifest 
destiny regarding long desired trade routes and resource extraction rights, sometimes in those 
same disputed zones.6 As the ice has melted the contestations and disagreements of the Arctic 
have boiled to the forefront into the popular consciousness on the Arctic region, disrupting some 
of the established habits present within the Arctic region.7  
Thus, given the amount of interest within the Arctic region throughout the global 
community, the nationalistic approaches advocated within several Arctic states, and the 
increasingly possible reality of an ice-free commercial Arctic layered on top of a region 
previously considered to be a geopolitical backwater it is important to examine the overall 
                                                      
4 The Arctic Council, "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council: Joint Communique of the 
Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council," (Ottawa, Canada: Arctic Council, 
1996). 
5 Klaus Dodds, "Flag Planting and Finger Pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the Political Geographies of 
the Outer Continental Shelf," Political Geography  (2010). 
6 I. A. Medby, "Articulating State Identity: 'Peopling' the Arctic State," ibid.62 (2018). 117 
7 Kathryn Isted, "Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes & Environmental Policy 




effectiveness of the Arctic Council in developing a community of states.8 Therefore, in order to 
examine the effectiveness of the Arctic Council in developing a cooperative community at the 
top of the world it is vital to propose the research question under what conditions can the Arctic 
Council facilitate cooperative policy developments in its members?  
In order to answer the research query it is important to propose the hypothesis of the 
national identity of member states limits the ability of the Arctic Council to affect cooperative 
policy change. To adequately test this hypothesis we must analyze the null hypothesis of the 
national identity of member states does not impact the ability of the Arctic Council to affect 
cooperative policy change. The best course of action to analyze the null hypothesis is to first 
contextualize the Arctic region in global politics, next detail how the current literature has 
addressed the Arctic Council, third review the analytical methods, then scrutinize the policy 
decisions of Canada and Russia in interacting with the Arctic Council, before finally 
reconsidering the research question. Because, though it appears that the Arctic Council has 
successfully developed a community of states increasingly concerned with the environmental 
status of the region and willing to cooperate on conservation and scientific research critically 
important areas related to hard power development in the region are largely being ignored by the 
Council and its members. Instead it appears a normalization of relations is taking place, where 
the previously prevailing policy priorities of the Arctic states are being changed to become 
similar to those same states policy priorities to interstate relations outside of the unique 
environment of the Arctic region.  
 
                                                      
8 Ibid. 344; Dodds, "Flag Planting and Finger Pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the Political Geographies 
of the Outer Continental Shelf."; Keskitalo, "International Region-Building - Development of the Arctic as an 








Figure 1: Arctic Ice Melt 
 
In 1818 there were two things on every Londoner’s mind, the Ross expedition and 
Frankenstein.9 The narrative gripped Londoners with its portrayal of humanity and also for its 
relevance to public conscientiousness at the time. Frankenstein is bookended by chapters set in 
the Arctic and was published just weeks before the famous 1st Ross expedition for the Northwest 
                                                      





Passage of Canada.10 Ross’s expeditions cemented the status of the Arctic as a mysterious place 
where not even the mighty British navy could surmount the elements and left a profound 
impression on the British and European consciousness. The Ross expedition imparted a lasting 
impression of the Arctic as a realm of adventure, danger, scientific discovery, and exploration 
without the geopolitical significance to affect the politics among nations which had been 
imparted to other regions of the world.11 
This image of the Arctic would only begin to change during the 20th century with the 
development of the radio, nuclear deterrence, powerful icebreakers, and other specialized 
technologies.12 Moreover, as the planet warms due to climate change the Arctic has begun to 
gain strategic significance for both the states with coastlines on the ocean and others. While 
potentially disastrous for the environment of the Arctic, the warming of the Arctic climate and 
the reduction of sea ice has led to a diversification of the activities which occur within the Arctic 
Circle. The broad diversification of Arctic activities has been driven by the expectations of the 
populations within the states of the region as they possess the strongest preconceived ideas about 
the Arctic. Therefore, it is important to confine a contextualization of Arctic activity to states 
within the region and in possession of a coastline on the Arctic Ocean as those states possess the 
strongest ideas about the Arctic in crucial areas ranging from climate research to reindeer 
farming.13 Thus, it is important to contextualize the Arctic within the following key areas of 
Arctic activity which have remained prevalent for states and impacted their populaces throughout 
the 20th century; the geographical limitations for trade, the Arctic as a scientific zone of 
                                                      
10 Mary W. Shelley, Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus (Oxford University Press, 1998). 
11 M. Ross, Polar Pioneers: John Ross and James Clark Ross 
 (McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 1994). 
12 O. R. Young, "Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North," Polar Record 45, no. 232 
(2009). 73 
13Birger Poppel, "Interdependence of Subsistence and Market Economies in the Arctic 
" The Economy of the North, Statistics Norway  (2006).; L. C. Jensen and P. W. Skedsmo, "Approaching the North: 




research, the economic capacity of the Arctic region, and finally the strategic aspects of the 
region.  
Geographic Limitations on Trade 
 
 
Figure 2: Arctic Trade Routes 
 
The Arctic has always remained a difficult to traverse region even in the height of 
summer when sea ice is at its lowest in the year. The polar ice cap has prevented the Arctic 




ground or below the ice for year-round transit. 14 Yet, the Arctic has a strong history of being 
viewed as a potential trade route for significant amounts of global trade with the greatest 
impediment being the sea ice present in the region’s waterways. 15  The restrictions to travel 
created by sea ice have been ever present within the Arctic region and directly impacted how the 
region has been thought of throughout the globe and can be viewed as the single biggest 
impediment to Arctic. With this in mind, it is crucial to understand how the Arctic has been 
contextualized as a geographically limited region due to the unique constraints of Arctic 
ecosystem on travel. In fact, these impediments to travel permeate the whole of the Arctic space 
and are crucial to understanding how, why, and when new opinions on the Arctic develop. 
Therefore, it is critical to examine the role sea ice has played in limiting travel and trade in the 
Arctic over time by first detailing the how traditional sea travel was blocked by ice before 
exploring how the 20th century has transformed Arctic transit.  
From a historical perspective, the Arctic never really had a large scale of activity within 
its seas because of the geographic limitations imposed by sea ice and the incapability of 
seafaring technology. Initially, Travel in and around the Arctic Ocean was limited to the summer 
months for seagoing vessels and even then the perils of navigating the shifting ice still 
persisted.16 Trade Routes, such as the Northwest and Northeast Passages, persisted as powerful 
motivating tool for the European powers to continue to probe the northern edges of North 
America to find a potential outlet into the Pacific Ocean and onto East Asia lasting well into 
modern times, unfortunately the discovery of such a route to pass through the ice proved 
                                                      
14 J. Dittmer et al., "Have You Heard the One About the Disappearing Ice? Recasting Arctic Geopolitics," Political 
Geography 30, no. 4 (2011). 201 
15 Ross, Polar Pioneers: John Ross and James Clark Ross 
16 S. G. Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown - the Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming," Foreign 




continually elusive.17 The dangers of Arctic waters became common knowledge readily quickly 
and several expeditions from the British government alone turned back well before the sea had 
become too treacherous or the ships had become locked in ice due simply to the fear of 
becoming locked in ice.18 These fears persisted throughout nearly all of the explorations into the 
Arctic which were continually funded by the governments of Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, 
Russia, the United States, and the Netherlands dating back to the 1400’s.19  Each of these 
expeditions brought back tales of ice sheets capable of sinking ships and fantastic landscapes 
caked in snow even in the middle of the summer months, establishing the Arctic as an 
inhospitable, desolate, and most importantly impossible place for any sailor. It is vital to note 
that here is where the limitations of the technological developments of the expeditions to explore 
the Arctic become shockingly clear. The oceangoing vessels utilized by sailors prior to the 
invention of the steam-powered icebreaker were ice strengthened wooden vessels which posed 
the danger of being too large to navigate through ice fields reliably, either ending up crushed by 
ice or damaged beyond repair within the region.20 It was only following the development of 
modern icebreakers in the Gulf of Finland by the mid-1800s that a reliable, blue-water capable, 
large vessel would be able to successfully navigate ice fields, yet even then these icebreakers 
were only useful up to a certain thickness of ice which varied with each vessel.21 This is 
significant because though several of the historic expeditions returned with maps of the islands 
and coastlines of the Arctic; however, the ever-shifting nature of sea ice made such maps 
severely limited the usefulness of such maps as ice sheets ebb and flow with the tides.22 Thus, 
                                                      
17 Ibid. 70 
18 J. Douglas Hoare, Arctic Exploration (Methuen & Company, 1906). 131 
19 Ibid. 224 
20 Deinder S. Sodhi, "Northern Sea Route Reconnaissance Study: A Summary of Icebreaking Technology," (1995). 
1 
21 Ibid. 1 




sea ice remained an ever present issue for the traversing of the Arctic which only truly began to 
become mitigated with the invention of robust icebreakers in the mid-19th century.  
 
 
Figure 3: Vessels Traversing through Arctic 
 
Fortunately, the 20th century experienced some significant thaw in regards to a more 
traversable and tradable Arctic due to both technological innovation and the warming of the 
Arctic Ocean. Throughout much of the 20th century the old barriers to travel remained impeding 
traffic through the Arctic Ocean; however, the development of new, more powerful icebreakers 
alongside more modern ships enabled broader access across areas such as the northern coast of 
Asia.23 It was now possible to have ships traverse the Arctic during certain periods of the year 
with icebreaker escort, and due to the extent of their Arctic territories the Soviet Union would 
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possess the largest fleet of icebreakers.24Thus, portions of the Arctic Ocean now became more 
open to trade and activity, notably taking the form of military bases, ports supporting the 
extraction of natural resources, and supporting Arctic communities. Moreover, as climate change 
has gone on the geographic limitations posed by sea ice have become less robust impediments 
than they were before. The strongest obstruction to Arctic transportation has been Arctic sea ice, 
but warming Arctic temperatures has been reducing the extent and thickness of the ice by nine 
percent annually over the past thirty years.25 Thus, climate change has made the Arctic 
increasingly more traversable to ocean going traffic, making it easier to maneuver material via 
ship to various Arctic ports previously only open in the summer months and reduced the danger 
of sea ice to travel year-round. The new accessibility of the Arctic has prompted a new line of 
thinking from within the states with Arctic territories and states outside of the region as a new 
frontier for investment has become available. For a ready example of the ease of Arctic travel 
one can look at the Bahaman flagged Crystal Serenity which traversed the long sought Northwest 
Passage through the Canadian Arctic in the summer of 2017 while carrying 1400 passengers.26 
And that cruise company is not alone. However, in the midst of the latest opening up of new sea 
routes and the reduction of sea ice is seeing a dramatic effect on Arctic and non-Arctic states 
alike. The reduction of geographic limitations on the Arctic in terms of sea-ice melt has sparked 
various efforts from Arctic states to prepare for future access in the region as the planet warms. 
Policies have been adapted or crafted to prepare Arctic states for new traffic in Arctic regions, 
ranging from the refurbishment and deepening of port facilities in the United States, Canada, and 
Russia to the development of new ice-capable Naval vessels in Denmark, Canada, and the United 
                                                      
24 Ibid. 
25 Josefino C. Comiso, "A Rapidly Declining Perennial Sea Ice Cover in the Arctic," Geophysical Research Letters 
29, no. 20 (2002). 1 
26 R. K. Headland, "Transits of the Northwest Passage to End of the 2018 Navigation Season Atlantic Ocean-Arctic 




States.27 Additionally, non-Arctic states have increasingly become active in examining Arctic 
politics with states like Singapore, China, India, and a slew of European states joining the Arctic 
Council as observer states, made significant investments into Arctic infrastructure, or are 
otherwise preparing for changes in the characteristics of the Arctic region which may make trade 
increasingly probable.28  
The Arctic’s unique environment played a prominent role in ensuring that few 
oceangoing vessels were able to cross its waters and actively engage the region. Yet as time as 
gone on the historical limitations on Arctic travel have faded with the emergence of a new Arctic 
tamed in part by technology and rising temperatures. The new, emerging Arctic is one which is 
more accessible, rapidly changing, and garnering more interest for the potential it has been 
believed to have for hundreds of years as a trade route.29  Therefore, though the Arctic has been a 
realm with geographic limitations climate change has transformed the Arctic Ocean from an ice-
locked sea into a new highway for travel and trade.  
A Scientific Region 
Institutions like the Norwegian Polar Institute were founded early on in the 20th century 
to study the region’s unique environment, climate, and the role it plays in the world system, and 
were joined later by a myriad of organizations focused on scientific endeavors in the region.30 As 
time has gone on, those various public and private supported research groups have been the 
groups to identify the rapidness of sea ice retreat and distribute such knowledge to the global 
populace.31  As these reports have disseminated, more organizations, states, and institutions have 
                                                      
27Robert Neil Huebert; Heather Exner-Pirot; Adam Lajeunesse; Jay Gulledge, "Climate Change and International 
Security: The Arctic as a Bellweather," (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2012). 3 
28 Ibid. 21 
29 Dittmer et al., "Have You Heard the One About the Disappearing Ice? Recasting Arctic Geopolitics." 201 
30 Harald D. Jolle, "The History of the Norwegian Polar Institute." 





become interested in studying the Arctic for a variety of reasons. Even now the international 
community has continually updated and shared reports, with coordination from a variety of state 
researchers, scientists, and climatologists discussing the Arctic in a variety of forums. Thus, in 
order to grasp how the Arctic has been thought of in terms as a scientific region it is important to 
breakdown into two prominent pushes from the scientific community; the study of the global 
climate and the study of the arctic environment.  
Initially, the Arctic has been a hotbed for climatologists studying the global climate 
through the research carried out in the Arctic region, both in present climate research and historic 
global climate. The Arctic may not seem to be the location to study current effects of items like 
climate change or even ongoing weather systems, yet the region has been host to weather 
installations and research stations since the early 20th century.32 It was believed during the 1930s 
and 1940s that the weather currently experienced in the Arctic would eventually hit or effect 
population centers in Europe, prompting the Germany army in the Second World War to 
establish weather monitoring stations in Greenland and the Svalbard Islands.33 Additionally, the 
polar location of the region coupled with its environmental fragility makes it into an ideal region 
to study climate change. Essentially, the climate and environment of the Arctic region is 
sensitive to changes in the overall global climate and shifts in the climate, such as increased 
global temperatures of CFC pollution in the atmosphere can have a profound effect on overall 
global climates.34 This atmospheric sensitivity of the Arctic region was first readily noticed in 
the Antarctic region with the hole in the Ozone layer and saw the first real international 
                                                      
32 Daniel Heidt, "Clenched in the Jaws of America? Canadian Sovereignty and the Joint Arctic Weather Stations, 
1946-1972," in Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 4: Canadian Arctic 
Sovereignty and Security: Historical Perpsectives ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer (University of Calgary 2011). 148 
33 Frode Skarstein, "A Cursed Affair-How a Norwegian Expedition to Greenland Became the Usa's First Maritime 
Capture in World War Ii," Polar Research 26, no. 2 (2007). William Barr, "Wettertrupp Haudegen: The Last 
German Arctic Weather Station of World War Ii. Part I," Polar Record 23, no. 143 (1986). 143 
34 Annika E. Nilsson, A Changing Arctic Climate: Science and Policy in the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 




agreement related to climate change with the establishment of the Montreal Protocol in 1989, 
which would then re-establish the Polar regions as an important area for the study of the global 
climate and lead eventually to the founding of the Arctic Council. Moreover, the Arctic region 
has also played a critical role in studying the historic global climate.  few regions possess long 
lasting bodies of ice which trap sediment in their layers that remain credible to study historic 
climates, among the most popular regions for these coring expeditions is the Arctic region for the 
age of the glaciers in places like Greenland or Norway and the relative ease of access to the 
region.35 The expeditions, research stations, and international cooperation on the study of the 
historic climate has provided a host of climate data which relates not just to the history of the 
climate of the Arctic region but has provided a window in time to a rough picture of the total 
global climate stretching back hundreds of thousands of years ago.36 Thus, the arctic region 
today represents a critical zone to study the global climate and provide insight into how humans 
have affected the global climate. Today, the Arctic retains its importance to modern meteorology 
and climate studies with the most interesting recent developments have been the emerging study 
of permafrost locked methane gas and the role the Polar Regions play in reflecting solar radiation 
back into space.37 
As climate scientists and meteorologists study the Arctic region to enhance human 
understanding of the historic climate and the effects humans have had on the climate over time, a 
host of environmentalists, conservationists, and biologists have made their mark as well. The 
Arctic features a unique and fragile environment as previously mentioned, and the best way to 
examine how this has factored into the scientific perception of the region is to detail the 
conservation of the unique ecosystem and the severe concern for pollution in the region. Initially, 







in recent years the conservation of the Arctic ecosystem has become increasingly salient in the 
international community. The best indicator for such efforts is of course the humble polar bear, 
one of the largest and most visible creatures affected by the retreat of the ice sheets. 
Conservation efforts for the polar bear emerged in relation to their loss of habitat due directly to 
climate change.38 A variety of international institutions like the World Wildlife Fund latched 
onto the polar bear as the most visibly impacted Arctic animal in the hopes of increasing public 
support for their conservation efforts and to a large degree it has proven successful with the 
governments of Canada, the United States, Denmark, Norway, and the Soviet Union signing onto 
the International Polar Bear Agreement in 1973.39 The status of the polar bear is one which is 
continually looked to as the poster child of the status of the Arctic environment, but the region as 
a whole experiences a host of support for the study of the changes within the environment and 
those animals residing in its unique ecosystem. While Arctic animals reliant on sea ice are 
getting attention, the various commonly fished fish species call the Arctic home from Pollock to 
cod, and a host of international agreements, treaties, and organizations exist to help manage 
those fish populations to prevent overfishing in the region.40 For instance, the status of fisheries 
has often factored into Norwegian-Russian relations in regards to the Barents Sea and the 
Svalbard Islands deep within the Arctic Ocean, in addition to contributing in part to historical 
animosity between various Arctic states.41 Thus, the establishment of new programs, treaties, and 
agreements to manage the Arctic population of fishes is not out of the ordinary and often 
discussed feature of politics at the top of the world, with the most recent being the Agreement to 
                                                      
38 Rachel Slocum, "Polar Bears and Energy-Efficient Lightbulbs: Strategies to Bring Climate Change Home," 
Environment and Planning Discourse: Society and Space 22 (2004). 426 
39 Pal Prestrud and Ian Stirling, "The International Polar Bear Agreement and the Current Status of Polar Bear 
Conservation," Aquatic Mammals 20, no. 3 (1994). 113 
40 M. Byers, "Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study," International Relations 31, no. 4 (2017). 
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Prevent Unregulated Commercial Fishing on the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean in 
October of 2018.42  
An important offshoot of the environmentalism and conservation previously discussed, 
preventing and responding to pollution has been increasingly important to Arctic states as time 
has gone on especially in hydrocarbon pollution and communal response goals. The most 
damaging type of pollution which can be experienced in a clime like the Arctic is that of an oil 
spill. Increased activity in the Arctic Ocean and the discussions of placing oil platforms, 
increasing shipping, and the shipping of oil via ship has brought up fears of the Exxon-Valdez 
Oil Spill to the front of several environmental discussions.43  Essentially, no Arctic state wishes 
to see the fragile environment brought closer to the brink by something akin to an oil spill and 
has been actively working towards preventing such spills through regulation whenever possible 
in order to avoid the financial and political costs of addressing oil spills in the frigid region.44 
The communal push towards the regulation of oil extraction and other sources of potential 
hydrocarbon pollution has in turn empowered a communal response to such disasters in the 
region. Essentially, the public consciousness in regarding the Arctic is mostly determined to 
ensure the region remains as unspoiled as possible to help preserve the already threatened 
ecosystem.45 Popular protests, non-governmental campaigns, and lobbying efforts related to oil 
extraction in the region are not uncommon in the domestic politics for members of the Arctic 
council, and often enjoy some success. Take for instance the efforts of a variety of organizations 
during the Obama Administration in the United States to prevent oil extraction in the Arctic 
Ocean and the subsequent executive order to ban oil exploration in the Arctic Ocean North of 
                                                      
42 Office of the Spokesperson, "U.S. Signs Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Commerical Fishing on the High Seas 
of the Central Arctic Ocean," news release, 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/10/286348.htm. 
43 Young, "Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North." 79 
44 Ibid.80 




Alaska.46 The most visible demonstration of popular dissatisfaction regarding Arctic oil drilling 
which led to an international incident involved Greenpeace’s protests over Russian Oil Platforms 
in the Arctic Ocean which impacted relations between Russia and the United States47.  Even 
today, the popular inclination to disapprove of Arctic oil exploration and extraction coupled with 
the costs of operating within the region have dissuaded several oil companies from engaging in 
the region or reduce their footprint within it.48 Thus, the communal push towards hydrocarbon 
extraction in the Arctic has become a salient political issue for some Arctic Council members at 
best and at worst has become visible and disapproved of by the broader international community.  
The Arctic region has always engaged the minds of scientists to study its unique insights 
into our planet’s climate and the inhabitants. Overtime the visibility in terms of a realm of 
scientific study, information, and conservation has emerged, especially in the years since 1989’s 
Montreal Protocol and the crisis of the hole in the Ozone above Antarctica. Climate change has 
only served to make such scientific issues more prominent for the region and much more salient 







                                                      
46 Darryl Fears and Juliet Eilperin, "President Obama Bans Oil Drilling in Large Areas of Atlantic and Arctic 
Oceans," The Washington Post 2016. 
47 Pavel K. Baev, "Russia's Arctic Ambitions and Anxieties," Current History 112, no. 756 (2013). 
48 Erin McGroarty, "Protestors Take over Anwr Environmental Scoping Meeting," Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, 





Arctic Economic Overview 
Estimated Regional Oil 
Reserves 
89,983.21 Million Barrels49 
Savings on Shipping Costs for 
Bulk Carrier Transportation 
$80,00050 
Distance Saved in Travel 
from Europe to Asia 
5,000 Miles (Two Weeks travel 
compared to other routes)51 
Table 1: Arctic Economic Overview 
 
Historically the arctic has been a region without a great deal of economic activity of any 
significance, due to inaccessibility and high costs to operate in the region. In spite of these 
limitations, there have been a few prominent industries above the Arctic Circle ranging from the 
extraction of natural resources to the previously mentioned fisheries.52 Ultimately, none of these 
industries save for the oil, gold and fishing industries have yielded significant returns for states 
and even those industries are much more expensive in the climes of the Arctic. As the sea ice 
recedes and the region warms, the Arctic is increasingly being declared to be “open for business” 
in every state bordering it. Speculative exploration for oil has occurred off the coasts of Canada, 
Russia, Greenland, Norway, and Alaska.53 Additionally, the potential trade routes of the region 
have drawn a myriad of investors and attention from all over the globe, with thousands of 
nautical miles, man hours, resources, money, and time saved compared to other trade routes if 
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the Arctic can be suitable for shipping in the future.54 This trade route speculation has firmly 
taken hold on states and corporations, for instance Chinese Premier Xi Jinping declaring a goal 
for a Polar Silk Road to connect the European and Chinese markets by utilizing the Russian 
Northern Route through the Arctic.55 Essentially, the economic aspects of the Arctic region have 
several states chomping at the bit to exploit the new opportunities within the region. To better 
understand this relatively new phenomenon for the region, it is important to once again visit the 
status of hydrocarbon extraction in the region and the role climate change is playing regarding 
Arctic economic activity. 
First, the Arctic has a great deal to offer state economies in terms of hydrocarbon 
extraction which is most readily understood through the examination of the Arctic’s history 
regarding oil and the role large corporations have played in the region. Historically, the Arctic 
has played an important role in pushing the Arctic region into the economic spotlight. Following 
the 2nd World War, a series of oil exploration efforts underwent across the globe to determine 
where the global reserves of oil were located and the Arctic was predicted to hold a great deal of 
the globe’s untapped oil reserves.56 This prediction prompted a series of expeditions into the 
region to determine exactly where these deposits of oil were to be found and how accessible they 
were for extraction.57 Ultimately, the predicted reserves have encouraged several oil companies 
from throughout the globe to pursue oil located within the Arctic region or nearby it, with the 
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most readily accessible areas of oil having been tapped by Russia.58 The harshness of the region 
though has led to a major concern for oil population for each state within the Arctic region due to 
the oil pipelines used for transport. The Arctic climate has continually been a thorn in the side for 
the companies seeking to extract Arctic oil as the extreme weather conditions makes maintaining 
any kind of infrastructure expensive and sea routes all but impossible for transporting oil. The 
persistence of this problem has led to some innovation regarding oil extraction technologies, yet 
there still remain the question of accessibility.59 Nearly all of this innovation for Arctic oil 
operations has been pursued by oil companies and increasingly funding has been going towards 
more advanced forms of oil extraction. Essentially, the Arctic region has been viewed by oil 
companies as a massive opportunity for investment because of its relative untapped potential 
compared to other global regions.60 The state with the most action regarding Arctic oil extraction 
is Russia due to the relative accessibility of the reserves of oil off its coast in the Arctic Ocean 
and Barents Sea, and the relationship it has with its major state-owned oil companies.61 Russian 
oil companies like Gazprom have continually viewed the Arctic as the means to continue their 
levels of oil extraction and have used the amount of predicted oil reserves to garner investment 
from throughout the world into Russian Arctic territories to extract and explore for oil.62 Thus it 
is apparent that oil is important for the Arctic economy and a major driver because of the 
importance of hydrocarbons for the global economy.  
The effects of climate change become more apparent in the Arctic region yearly, and due 
to those changes the economy of the Arctic Ocean has been looked towards for a major 
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resurgence. Essentially, climate change is viewed as a major opportunity for the states with 
Arctic territory because of how sea ice retreat transforms oil transportation and relatively lessens 
technological reliance for economic activity. Initially, the largest change for the Arctic region’s 
economy because of the effects of climate change is the transformation of hydrocarbon 
transportation. As previously mentioned the Arctic utilizes pipelines to transport hydrocarbons 
across vast swathes of territory, which is not the most cost efficient means of transporting oil.63 
Throughout the world it is usually much easier to transport oil and other goods via waterways, 
and climate change is making this a reality for the Arctic. As sea ice retreats it will be possible to 
construct oil terminals for tanker ships making it safer, easier, and more efficient to transport oil 
and other petroleum products.64 Moreover, it is easier to refurbish ports in the region than to 
construct whole new pipelines stretching from Siberia to the Russian heartland, coming with the 
added benefit of being capable to berth vessels capable of transporting other good to and from 
the region as well.65 Another boon to the Arctic economy is as climate change affects the region, 
it will become slightly less technologically intensive to operate within the region. In the first 
subsection of this chapter, there was a broad discussion on transportation in the Arctic and the 
role icebreakers played in making the region more accessible. This is a major benefit and 
indicative of the overall condition of the region, right now it is costly to operate any kind of 
facilities in the Arctic for economic gain. Transportation of goods in the Arctic is expensive due 
to the cost of infrastructure maintenance within the region, the region’s geographic location away 
from main economic sectors, and the reduction of traditional regional transportation such as ice-
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roads.66 The versatility of port facilities in light of opening waterways varies from state to state 
in the Arctic region, but given the impact of climate change on other modes of transportation 
within the region the opening of maritime routes represents an opportunity for transportation 
improvements.67 Bettering transportation to the region through the opening of waterways could 
prove critical in developing economic activity in the region and more efficiently connect the 
region to the global economy.  
The economic realities of a new Arctic birthed by climate change are still unknown, 
though there are some promising forecasts from a variety of states, corporations, and 
municipalities within the region. The Arctic has had a historic role in providing energy to the 
global economy and it is very likely that role will only become more prominent as the ice once 
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Figure 4: Arctic Territorial Disputes 
  
From a military perspective, the Arctic has featured prominently in the minds of 
politicians and military leaders for hundreds of years. As previously discussed the initial 
concerns of these individuals was in the Arctic as a region for trade and even then those 
inclinations varied from state to state. However, the strategic location of the Arctic as the 
shortest route between North America, Europe, and Asia has historically attracted a great deal of 
military interest, notably in during the Cold War.68 As climate change lessens the frigid grip of 
sea-ice on Arctic waterways, the military dimensions of the Arctic are bound to continually 
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resurface in domestic and international discourses of Arctic states; therefore it is important to 
contextualize the region as a strategic zone for military activity by examining traditional Arctic 
military operations and emerging Arctic military developments.  
Traditionally, the Arctic has generally had a pacifying effect on the states interacting 
between it due to how difficult it was to operate within the region and it status as an area for 
nuclear deterrence. First, the sea ice which has been previously mentioned as a major block in 
transit within the Arctic has also impeded military operations by nearly all of the Arctic states in 
the region. As an impediment the sea ice and temperatures of the region has proven problematic 
in encouraging territorial disputes, yet also beneficial in inhibiting the escalation of territorial 
disputes into conflicts.69 Moreover, operations within the region necessitate a higher level of 
training to operate within its seas and shores then other regions of the world with little cross 
application other than the Antarctic.70 Thus, the presence of military forces in the region was 
determined by global issues causing the Arctic to be populated by token forces, military 
observers, and troops designated for operations elsewhere in the world in regions less restricted 
by environmental factors like sea-ice.71 Therefore the fungibility of capability in the region has 
led to a relatively pacific region in terms of generalized military activity, yet it is important to 
note the Arctic has played a significant role in the nuclear deterrence of the Cold War.72 The only 
way to maneuver through the Arctic region without impediments has continually been the usage 
of submarines, and following the implementation of mutually assured destruction policies for 
both the Soviet Union and the United States the Arctic gained new significance as a base for 
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ballistic missile submarines.73 Following the Cold War, the Arctic has played a role in nuclear 
weapons as well through missile defense systems.74 Beyond these factors, a majority of the 
military involvement in the Arctic has traditionally been related to coast guard activities and 
intermittent training operations.  
As climate change has affected the Arctic so too has it affected the military dimensions of 
the region. Climate change has served to reignite the passions of Arctic populations and also 
remedied the issue of white-water navies. Initially, as the Arctic has warmed it has increased the 
visibility of the region in the minds of politicians, military leaders, and citizens throughout the 
Arctic states.75 Take for instance the Harper administration of Canada, Harper made his run for 
premiership on the basis of reasserting Canadian authority in the Arctic and maintained 
leadership for nine years.76 The political saliency of the Arctic exists throughout the region as 
well, though its traction in the political sphere varies from state to state CITATION. Moreover, 
even in states where the Arctic remains on the relative fringes of the political discussions within 
capitals the transformation of the region and its resulting impact on the global economy has 
warranted a response from military planners, for instance in the US quickly shelved a plan for 
constructing a new icebreaker when the political debate moved elsewhere but the US military 
released several documents expressing the importance of the region to future US policy in the 
form of the US Navy’s Arctic Road Map.77 Furthermore, various governmental agencies across 
the Arctic region have sought to improve their military capabilities within the region, ranging 
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from the refurbishment of existing port facilities, the purchasing of new Cold-Weather 
equipment, and the training of troops in extreme weather conditions.78 In the midst of all of this 
though, most prominently is the discussion of naval operations within the region. As previously 
noted, the Arctic has hosted and continues to host naval forces from the nations inhabiting it; 
however, it is important to distinguish between the white-water forces and blue water forces of 
the region. An overwhelming majority of the fleets of the Arctic states are blue-water forces, yet 
it is important to note that as climate change reduces the thickness and extent of Arctic ice sheets 
more blue-water forces are building ice-capable ships for Arctic patrol.79 Fundamentally, the 
retreat of sea-ice is encouraging militarization of the region through the construction of new 
patrol vessels, the refurbishment of ports for military usage, and new training operations for 
forces expected to operate regionally.80 As the Arctic continues to warm the region will become 
more accommodating to regular blue-water navies, thereby becoming increasingly more able to 
be militarized as states will not require specific technologies for their forces like icebreakers to 
operate within the region.  
While most of this militarization can be pointed towards to be the simple development of 
capabilities to adjust to changes in the region, it is still a militarization of the region which 
historically has had severe limitations to travel and military activity. The major response of the 
Arctic states has been to, as a community; ignore the transforming military dimensions which are 
emerging to the Arctic region within international institutions. 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Already there exists a host of literature related to the study of the Arctic, the Arctic 
Council, and national identity. Importantly though, there is not piece in the body of literature I 
have found which directly relates to the study of the overall effectiveness of the Arctic Council 
in fostering change within its member states over the course of its entire existence. Thus, it is 
important to briefly examine a small sample of relevant literature to this research before moving 
on. The literature currently in existence on the Arctic Council and the Arctic is best broken into 
NINE differing sections related to the following concepts; critical concepts for analysis, the 
Arctic Council, Arctic economics, national identity in political discourse, polar security, 
cooperation in the Arctic, Canada in the Arctic, and Russia in the Arctic. 
Critical Concepts of Analysis 
Initially, the most important pieces of the puzzle for examining the intersection of 
national identity, national interests, and the Arctic Council is the theoretical framework utilized 
within this research. To fit this end the critical frameworks utilized for this research is tripartite 
in its focus and including the following critical concepts; Mackinder’s geopolitics, Copeland’s 
trade security spiral, and Hopf’s logic of habit.   
First, in terms of developing critical areas of importance for the study of the Arctic 
region, it is critically important to begin with a brief examination of Hartford Mackinder’s 
Democratic Ideals and Reality. Mackinder argues in this piece that the endowments of a state in 




states.81 Moreover, the geographic location of those states and the geography between the state 
and where their interests lie is vitally important in terms of approaching broader issues of 
international relations.82 Though Mackinder only truly mentions the Arctic in passing as an 
impediment to circumnavigation of Eurasia, the geopolitics Mackinder lays out in this piece are 
critical to examining how the scope and scale of the Arctic’s transformation are so significant for 
the global community.  
Next, for Copeland, one of the most important features of the international system is how 
each state relates to the other in terms of trade and economics. Copeland argues each state will 
seek to protect its own economic interests and to maintain monopolies on its trade routes 
whenever possible.83 Copeland proposes the encroachment upon or destruction of the 
monopolies states possess on markets propagates wars between the states encroaching upon and 
the states controlling those markets.84 Given the expressed importance of the Arctic as a 
commercial region for the states on its borders, Copeland’s piece is significant as it directly 
examines how states seek to protect and exploit markets they perceive they have a unique claim 
upon.   
Finally, in Hopf’s view international relations can be broken down into a series of 
fundamental engagements between states which then set the tone for the overall interactions 
between those states.85 Essentially, Hopf argues there are logics of habit which persists within 
the international community, particularly in the foreign policies of states in interacting on nearly 
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every issue and event.86 Hopf argues these logics create lenses by which states view the world 
and color their opinions of the actions of other states in certain situations.87 Though Hopf argues 
these habits can be mutable, they are only mutable with great difficulty because to create a logic 
of habit within the international system takes time and effort.88 Hopf’s piece is important as it 
provides a means to examine how Arctic politics may change as the logics which have led to 
modern Arctic politics are transformed by climate change.  
In terms of conjunction, the combination of Mackinder’s concept of the world island and 
Copeland’s insistence on the importance of trade route security offers an interesting framework 
for analyzing the interactions of Arctic militarization on interstate relations within the region. 
Meanwhile, the logic of habit offers interesting insights related to how the Arctic states, notably 
the coastal Arctic states, will interact as the region becomes increasingly viable for trade and 
travel. Thus, it is critical to not just include these pieces in this body of research but to combine 
them to develop a better idea of the progression of Arctic politics over the past thirty years.  
The Arctic Council 
It is impossible to have a discussion related to the ability of the Arctic Council to affect 
its members without including the body of literature currently regarding the Arctic Council. To 
this end it is important to examine how the region was initially constructed and how the unique 
problems of the Arctic are posing a challenge to the Council.  
Initially, Young provides a wonderful examination of the Arctic Council, the 
fundamental structures of its cooperative frameworks, and the problems it faces within the 







region.89 Young details emerging problems such as the issue of developing legally binding 
regimes for the region and the question of a potential Arctic Treaty in line with the Antarctic 
Treaty.90 Young concludes with an overview of the place of the Arctic Council in Arctic politics, 
proposing the Council should only focus on issues where it has a distinct advantage compared to 
other organizations and can therefore excel.91 Kesktialo builds off of Young’s ideas regarding the 
Arctic Council through her study of how the Arctic has been constructed as a region both 
through the various projects of its international institutions and the preexisting region-building 
literature.92 Arguing the Arctic is a constructed region built by the interests of its principle actors 
within the Arctic Council and their according interests, stemming from historic interactions 
within the region.93 To this end, Kesktialo comparatively examines Nordic and North American 
views, concluding North American views have been the dominant discourse for the Arctic in its 
construction as a regime.94 It is critical to include both of these pieces within this research 
because of their ability to provide unique perspectives on the Arctic Council’s construction and 
ability to create an international region of the Arctic. 
Second, it is important to detail how the Council has reacted and responded to the 
ongoing challenges of interacting at the top of the world.  Young examines the impact ongoing 
environmental changes have had on Arctic governance, cooperation, and the Arctic Council.95 
Young considers a variety differing solutions proposed to moderate the changing physical and 
political environment at the top of the world, arguing a tripartite solution to the problems of the 
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Arctic is required.96 In Young’s view this tripartite solution relies on agreements regarding 
territorial disputes, a push to construct issue-tailored governmental regimes, and an expansion of 
the character of the Arctic Council to meet these emerging issues.97 Byers builds off of Young’s 
concerns regarding the Arctic Council’s ability to respond to emerging issues in terms of 
encroachment of other international politics into the Arctic region’s relationship by examining 
the impacts of the Ukrainian Crisis on the ability of the Arctic states to effectively cooperate 
within Arctic international relations.98 Byers frames his study of the status of Arctic politics 
before and after the Crimean crisis through the lens of Keohane and Nye’s image of complex 
interdependence.99 Ultimately, Byers discovers the Ukrainian Crisis has caused a suspension of a 
variety of military and economic cooperative programs, the programs most closely related to the 
Arctic in environmental, research sharing, and search and rescue operations remain resolute 
because of the complexities of the interdependence Russia has on the international organizations 
tailored to the region.100 Each of these pieces are important to include within my own research 
because of their ability to elucidate the capacity and capability of the Arctic Council to both 
weather and respond to Crises within and without the Arctic.  
Coupled together, each of these four pieces patches together paints a picture of the Arctic 
Council’s history of being shaped by the interests of its members and the broader interactions 
between the sub-blocs within it. Therefore, it provides an important angle to examine how the 
goals and objectives of the Council can ultimately be shaped by members and how each member 
responds to crises within the Arctic Community.  
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  Given the economic weight lent to the Arctic by the international community, it is vital to 
briefly review the importance levied towards Arctic economics by the scholarly community. This 
section is most efficiently divided into sections regarding how the Arctic community has reacted 
regarding Arctic economics and the domestic considerations of Arctic states regarding Arctic 
economics.  
First, Keil notes the various aspects of significant schools of international relations, 
neorealist and neoliberal institutionalism, thinking in regards to institutionalist explanations of 
the Arctic region’s cooperation on a variety of issues with a particular focus on economics.101 
Keil argues the debate between these two schools concerning the Arctic’s resource reserves has 
failed to adequately examine the varying motivations for Arctic states concerning Arctic 
resources, particularly oil and natural gas.102 In researching the interests of those Arctic states, 
Keil discovers a varying degree of interest related to those natural resources though there is 
nothing consistent or conclusive into the likelihood of confrontation among the Arctic states 
because a rush for Arctic rush is unlikely.103 Building off of this idea of a rush for Arctic 
resources being unlikely, Jensen and Skedsmo detail the various foreign policy discourses 
describing the relationship Russia and Norway have to the Arctic, particularly related to official 
communications to other states.104 To accomplish this Jensen and Skedsmo examine a host of 
official communications from both governments related to the Arctic, discovering the Norwegian 
approach is characterized by a discursive mobilization on Arctic issues while Russian approaches 
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are broadly characterized by assertiveness and relative gains problems.105 Jensen and Skedsmo 
argue such a difference is related to the relative resource endowments within the European Arctic 
and how those resources factor into the national interests of the state.106 With both of these 
pieces in mind, it is clear there are competing narratives regarding the Arctic’s resource 
endowments and their impact on the politics of the region.  
Along this line, Overland examines the domestic economic potential for the Russian 
Arctic. Overland asserts the view of Russian action in the Arctic as overly nationalistic and 
concerning is unfounded, instead she proposes Russian policy actions are completely in line with 
the broader region and the actions of other states.107 Notably, Overland concludes the broader 
economic considerations of the Arctic region are causing some measure of cooperation among 
the various states as international corporations maneuver throughout the region.108  Vladimirova 
builds off of these ideas related to broader spectrum cooperation among Arctic states in detailing 
the Russian approaches and beliefs related to sustainable economic development in the European 
Arctic.109 Vladimirova reveals the political discourse on sustainable, green development is 
different depending on with whom politicians are interacting.110 Within the international system 
Russian politicians are willing to support communal objectives related to green development and 
environmentalism, yet at home those same politicians are far more concerned with high rates of 
poverty and unemployment.111 Thus, domestically Russia is much more concerned with 
extracting resources in order to feed the needs of the economy and the people, rather than 
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preserving or managing those resources for future usage.112 Each of these pieces argues there is 
an almost paradoxical approach to economic development within the Arctic which almost pays 
lip service to the will of the international community.  
Taken as a whole there is an interesting assertiveness related to the economic 
developments of the Arctic region. There is simultaneously not great rush for Arctic natural 
resources, yet there remains a significant amount of domestic interest in those resources in order 
to fuel the growth of national power. Thus, the Arctic is a realm of both intense economic focus 
from the international and domestic communities of Arctic states but there is no real way to 
significantly enrich Arctic investors.  
Arctic Identity 
An urgently important facet of studying the intersection of Arctic identity, national 
interests, and the Arctic Council is the concept of Arctic identity as it exists within the Arctic 
states as they currently lie. Therefore it is important to detail how identity affects regime 
adherence, then the conceptualization of the Arctic within state bureaucracies, before finally 
detailing how the Arctic space is carved out in national discourse.  
First, Medby reviews the likelihood of regime adherence of Arctic states to the regimes 
created by the Arctic Council and the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas, 
utilizing Norway as a case study.113 Medby details the various pieces of Norwegian identity 
which factor into developing proper adherence to the regimes proffered within the international 
community and how those regimes in turn affect the identity of the state.114 Medby concludes the 
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national identity of Norway plays a significant role in determining the regime adherence of the 
Norwegian government. 115 
 In another piece, Medby examines how the arctic is conceptualized as a region in the 
identity of various bureaucrats working for the governments of the eight states of the Arctic 
Council.116 Medby’s discussion of the humanization of the Arctic by these bureaucrats offers an 
interesting introspection into how discourses related to national identity shape the individuals 
who assist in administering the state.117 This is critical because it offers insight into how the 
bureaucrats feel they should act in regards to the Arctic, or what they feel they should represent 
when administering the Arctic.118 
 Finally, Dittmer et al. detail how the space for Arctic geopolitics is carved out within the 
areas both within and without the Arctic Circle.119 The focus on the local and every day of the 
Arctic through the examination of the construction of Arctic geopolitics through the eyes of the 
people most closely experiencing them is used to offer a critique to the prevailing neo-realist 
identifications of emerging Arctic politics.120 Ultimately, the researchers conclude with a call to 
action related to studying the construction of the Arctic both through the ethnography of the 
region but also through its geographic construction as a near or far space related to scientific 
study.121  
 Taken as a group, these pieces paint a picture of a national identity for Arctic states 
rooted in key concepts which are uniquely Arctic and poignant for the population of these Arctic 
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states. What’s more is those identities play a significant role in outlining how the state 
government adheres to the tenants of institutional regimes and presents such information to the 
rest of its population, thereby creating salient issues related to the protection or preservation of 
the Arctic based on those same national identities. In this sense it is critical to include each of 
these pieces in this research on the Arctic Council’s ability to affect state policies.  
Polar Security 
As the Arctic has warmed, an increasing number of newspaper outlets have become 
concerned about the securitization of Arctic space by the states on the coast of the Arctic Ocean. 
Thus, it is important to include the scholarly body’s contribution to the study of polar security in 
the warming Arctic. The securitization of Arctic space is best considered in two parts; first the 
relationship between Arctic security and climate change and second the Russian-Western 
relationship in the Arctic.  
 First, it is important to understand the impacts of climate change on Arctic security. 
Gerhard et al. focus their piece on studying the impact of climate change on the regional politics 
of the Arctic related to the geographical spread of the Arctic region.122 The authors argue the 
Arctic is experiencing a host of impacts from climate change which may prove exacerbating to 
the ongoing regional tensions related to territorial disputes and intimacy.123 The authors conclude 
though climate change possesses the potential to increase the likelihood of conflict in the region, 
the various institutions within the region hold the potential to actually increase cooperation on 
unique Arctic issues as the region’s climate warms.124 Building off of the ideas of changes within 
the Arctic sphere, Blunden examines the ongoing security developments of the Arctic Council 
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since the collapse of the Soviet Union.125 Blunden argues the ongoing ice-melt within the Arctic 
poses the potential to transform ongoing Arctic relations from cooperation because of the amount 
of economic stakes within the region.126 Ultimately, Blunden concludes the ongoing rhetorical 
actions of the various Arctic states serves to distort the relatively stable region, with the only true 
security risk being the potential the rhetorical vitriol among the Arctic states to increase feelings 
of distrust among the Arctic states.127 Continuing the idea of economics being an Achilles heel to 
future Arctic relationships, Dodds analyzes how Arctic Coastal states utilize the international 
legal framework to reframe and justify their claims to exclusive economic zones in the midst of 
the Arctic Ocean.128 Dodds recognizes and details the various irritations levied by various states 
and indigenous peoples institutions who are dissatisfied with the overall treatment of the ongoing 
Arctic territorial disputes.129  Dodds concludes there is a rising concern the coastal Arctic states 
will seek to enhance their territorial claims as the overall region continues to warm and access 
improves.130 Taken as a group, it is clear climate change is altering the formerly stable 
relationships at the top of the world by increasing access to historical territorial disputes while 
decreasing costs of access for the navies of the Arctic Ocean. 
Second, the most important and ongoing facet of Arctic security relations is the historic 
dyad between the West and Russia. Atland and Pedersen examine the history of Russian-Western 
security policy interactions regarding the Norwegian Svalbard Archipelago.131 In order to 
examine these interactions and changes within Russian security policy, Atland and Pedersen 
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utilize a securitization framework in order to determine which issues hold the largest degree of 
importance to Russia.132 Ultimately, Atland and Pedersen reveal the great deal of concern the 
Russian government holds for Norwegian policies on the Svalbard Archipelago, leaving the 
Svalbard Islands a source of concern for Russian security policy.133 While Russia still has 
ongoing security concerns in the Arctic as elucidated by Atland and Pedersen, in another article 
Atland studies the Arctic interactions between the Russian military and the Russian oil industry 
in order to examine Russian desecuritization in the European Arctic.134 Interestingly, Atland 
unveils issues once solely pertinent to the Russian military are steadily becoming the realm of 
civilian economic activity in order to support the ongoing expansion of Russian Arctic oil 
extraction.135 Atland concludes this trend has been ongoing since the early 1990’s and will likely 
continue as desecuritization does not impede larger Russian security goals.136 This duality of 
Russian policies in the region is further explored by Baev. Baev reveals it is simultaneously a 
zone for cooperation and an area of possible contention with the West following the 2014 
Ukrainian Crisis.137 Baev argues the ongoing development of Russian military capabilities in the 
Arctic and the development of new Arctic infrastructure are incoherent to broader Russian policy 
related to the Arctic.138 Thus, Russia is left in a position of its military somewhat drawing down 
its capabilities in order to satisfy cooperative goals from the Russian foreign ministry despite the 
fact Russian military funding is what is financing the redevelopment of Soviet-Era settlements 
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and installations across Russia’s northern coast.139 All of these pieces together paint a picture of 
states seemingly confused as to how they would like to engage on another in such a strategically 
important region of the world.  
Both of the security relationships examined reveal an Arctic which is simultaneously 
dynamic in its development and stalled in how it would like to proceed with its security 
objectives. In a security sense, the melting of sea-ice has increased the visibility of emerging 
security issues to national governments while the historic animosities of the region are both 
reinforced by this and tempered by it.  
Canada and the Arctic 
Canada is never really considered by the average person to be a vital player in 
international politics, but in the Arctic that is a different story. For Canada, the Arctic is a key 
part of national identity, security policy, and economic future. Thus, it is important to examine 
how Canada approaches the Arctic in terms of security, economics, and national policy.  
 First, Byers researches the military dimension of Canada in the Arctic, proposing climate 
change has played a role in revolutionizing Arctic security and facilitating non-military 
cooperation among the Arctic states.140 However, Byers is sure to note the dimension of ongoing 
territorial disputes among the various Arctic states, particularly Canada.141 Yet, Byers remains 
hopeful the Arctic will retain its cooperative norms in the face of ongoing climate change due to 
the history among the Arctic states of cooperation on communal issues.142 Building off of the 
concern for territorial disputes mentioned by Byers, Griffiths reveals the upswing of nationalistic 
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sovereignty sentiment following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 related to the security of the 
Northwest Passage.143 Griffiths seeks to dispel the myth that Canadian national sovereignty is at 
risk in the Arctic due to the relatively slow decline of sea-ice and there is already a strong set of 
regulations related to Canadian waterways.144 Griffiths concludes the “…futile handwringing…” 
regarding the Northwest Passage is likely to continue, though he outlines several options for 
strengthening Canadian claims to the Northwest Passage by bolstering the Canadian relationship 
with the indigenous Inuit peoples.145 Both Byers and Griffiths reveal critical Canadian feelings 
towards the Arctic and the importance attached to it.  
Next, Ruel researches the interactions between national identity and the propensity to 
pursue natural resources within the Arctic region for Canada.146 Ruel argues the melting of the 
Arctic ice-cap is refocusing certain aspects of Canadian policy and identity towards the Arctic 
region, and ignoring the various real costs associated with the development of the Canadian 
Arctic.147 Ruel concludes the push to develop the Arctic region is one full of challenges and 
poses the risk to destabilize some of the relationships Canada has built with the indigenous 
peoples of the Canadian north.148 In this sense, Ruel paints a picture of Canada simultaneously 
ignorant of and interested in creating economic opportunities for itself in the Arctic.149 
In terms of national identity, Landriault investigates how Canadian public opinion on 
Arctic issues and assesses the effect of government activism on those opinions.150 Landriault 
examines polling over the course of the period from 2006-2015 related to circumpolar issues and 
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politics.151 Landriault concludes though Arctic issues do not overwhelm other significant issues 
for Canadians, they routinely receive a high level of support related to foreign policy and 
national defense.152 Landriault offers a caveat though in suggesting Canadian public opinion 
favors approaches to Arctic sovereignty prioritizing negotiations and international institutions.153 
Lackenbauer builds on the concept of prioritizing international institutions brought forth by 
Landriault in examining how the Canadian policy of “One Arctic” situates Canadian domestic 
policy in line with Canada’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council.154 Lackenbauer provides a 
historical examination of Canadian policy related to sovereignty finishing out with a comparison 
of the Trundeau administrations differences and similarities to the Harper administration related 
to the Arctic.155 Lackenbauer concludes the Canadian policy introduction of “One Arctic” fit into 
broader conceptions of the Arctic in a Canadian sense, and mark as another attempt to imprint a 
Canadian view of the Arctic onto the rest of the Arctic Council.156 As a pair, these authors 
research suggests while Canada is interested in pursuing institutional solutions to its problems, 
there is still a strong spring of national identity which colors its perceptions and interactions with 
those same institutions.  
Ultimately, all of these pieces together show a mosaic of Canadian beliefs related to the 
Arctic which are strongly held and in competition of Canadian policy goals. The propensity to 
view the Arctic as a realm in need of securitization despite the lack of tangible threats to 
Canadian national sovereignty is at odds with the desire to pursue institutional solutions to those 
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same problems. In sum, Canadian policy on the Arctic is a mixed bag of national interests, 
normal Canadian policy pursuits, and fears of a weakened Canada bullied by its neighbors.  
Russia and the Arctic 
Finally, for the proposes of examining how the national identities of Arctic states jive 
with the general goals of the Arctic Council it is critical to examine the scholarly research on 
Russia in the Arctic. As the largest Arctic state, both in terms of economic activity and 
population above the Arctic Circle, for Russia the Arctic region holds a great deal of interest as 
recognized by the scholarly community.  
Initially, Rowe and Blakkisrud seek to examine how the Arctic is uniquely 
conceptualized and constructed in terms of geopolitics by the Russian government.157 To 
accomplish this goal Rowe and Blakkisrud analyze Russian media reporting on the Arctic and 
Arctic issues coupled with qualitatively approaches regarding interviews with policy makers 
from Arctic states.158 Ultimately, the authors discover the most prominent methodology utilized 
by Russian policy makers in approaching the Arctic is to delineate the Arctic along lines related 
to cooperative measures and items more closely linked to national sovereignty.159 Interestingly, 
Rowe and Blakkisrud discover there is a value placed on cooperation with the West on Arctic 
issues and approaches often are to distance Russia from geopolitical or geostrategic aims.160  
Providing more detail on the work carried out by Rowe and Blakkisrud, Gritsenko details 
the various Russian policy agendas regarding the Arctic that have been reported on in a variety 
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of Russian media outlets.161 In analyzing six different newspapers Gritsenko discovered there 
was a transformation in reporting on the Arctic before and after the Ukrainian Crisis.162 Before 
the crisis, the newspapers were concerned with the economic opportunities and exploitation of 
the Arctic region, but afterwards the papers were most concerned with the impact of sanctions 
and securitization.163 
Furthering this same effort regarding domestic perceptions of Russian political narratives, 
Khrushcheva and Poberezhskaya delve into how the Arctic has been categorically represented 
within Russian political narratives.164 In order to operationalize this goal, the authors examine 
over a hundred various official documents available from the Russian president’s website.165 
These documents reveal the focus of the Russian president in discussing the Arctic frame Russia 
as an “Arctic Great Power” in emphasizing the various resource endowments, geographical 
location, and resource endowments.166Khrushcheva and Poverezhskaya note this rhetoric does 
not correlate with broader Russian policy in cooperation with the West on the Arctic. 167 
In terms of broader economic and policy development for Russia, Henry’s detailing of 
environmental movements within Russia is interesting for the purposes of this research.168 
Overall, instead of drawing on domestic support for environmental objectives, environmentalist 
movements in Russia rely on transnational support to achieve their objectives as the constraints 
regarding domestic organization within the Russian Federation are so strict in prohibiting 
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assembly.169 Ultimately, the efforts of these groups to enact change within their governments 
have been linked to rhetorical change unless there is congruence between economic and 
environmental goals.170 
Finally, in terms of looking towards the future for Russia, Antrim inspects the impact of 
Arctic climate change on the geopolitics of Russia.171 Historically, the Russian northern coastline 
was an area with very little importance for the international community and Russian policy 
objectives.172 Antrim contends as the Arctic climate warms and the sea-ice recedes the Russian 
northern coastline will become one of the most important trade routes in the world, serving as the 
means to catapult Russia from its status as a regional, landlocked power into a more conventional 
power.173 Antrim concludes her discussion of the potential future of the Russian Arctic with a 
variety of policy proposals for the United States in order to meet and mitigate this prospective 
future.174  
Each of these varying pieces paint a picture of a political system which is focused on 
making the most economically for their constituents and developing the Arctic to improve the 
status of Russia in the international system in terms of power and capability. However, 
simultaneously to that drive has been the drive for the Russian cooperation with the West in 
order to secure necessary support to make those dreams of an Arctic springboard to increase 
power a reality. Thus, for Russia the Arctic becomes a mixed bag of cooperative policies and 
nationalistic aims.  
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The Arctic has steadily gained prominence in the minds of scholars, policymakers, 
scientists, and businessmen alike. Historically there was a significant degree of fascination with 
the Arctic though the region was essentially closed off, and today the region is becoming 
increasingly open due to climate change.175 Thus, it is important before delving into the case 
studies of Russia and Canada to outline the methods utilized in the case studies, then to review 
the Arctic Council, before finally justifying the timeframe of study. 
Initially, from a methodological perspective it is vital to utilize a qualitative approach to 
studying the Arctic region. The qualitative approach is the best methodological route to study the 
region because avoids the current limitations on Arctic data, circumvents the pitfall of 
temporality, and is more accommodating to unquantifiable aspects of the region. First, the Arctic 
region possesses a host of interesting data related to variables relevant to a myriad of emerging 
issues in the Arctic. However, there simply isn’t enough data related to key issues such as Arctic 
developmental spending, surface military operations in the region, and Arctic ocean-going 
traffic. This is of course due to either the classified nature of the data or small sample sizes with 
only a few years of data collected. Moreover, the fact the Arctic Council has eight member-states 
further limits the data even more from a statistical analysis perspective. Therefore, statistical 
testing of datasets will not be pursued in this research and instead a qualitative approach is 
necessary. Next, with temporally sequential or linked data there are often glaring skews within 
statistical analyses. Given the relatively recent bump in Arctic interest, data on Arctic issues or 
interests may be skewed even further on a year-to-year basis, thus causing further issues for 
                                                      




statistical analyses of emerging Arctic phenomena. With this in mind, it is possible even if 
enough data was available to carry out a statistical analysis of the Arctic region and the issues 
most pertinent to it, then those results may not be as accurate to what is happening within the 
region. Accordingly, it is best to then pursue a qualitative analysis for the best analytical results. 
Finally, the Arctic is a region with a great degree of nuance and importance to the states which 
have territory within its bounds. Though some of this nuance has been explored in surveys, even 
more of the importance of the Arctic to the peoples of states like Russia, Canada, and Norway 
has yet to be operationalized or simply cannot be quantified. With such a crucial piece of the 
analytical puzzle outside of the reach of scholars for the purposes of statistical analysis, the only 
recourse is to adopt a qualitative analysis to delve into the significance of the region in the 
identity of the peoples and states calling the region home. Consequently, the best course of 
action to study the region is to pursue qualitative studies into the Arctic.  
As the premier international institution for the region, in addition to being one of the 
primary mechanisms studied in the context of altering state behavior, it is important to briefly 
explain the Arctic Council’s role in Arctic politics. Essentially, the Arctic Council operates as a 
forum and an advisory body for its member-states, through its various meetings and its working 
groups. Initially, the most prominent meetings of the Arctic Council are aptly termed the Arctic 
Council Ministerial Meetings. Every two years the leading diplomats of the Arctic Council, 
including observer states, meet to discuss the variety of reports, developments, and important 
issues of the region which developed in those two years.176 The Arctic Council Meetings always 
conclude with a declaration, though not legally binding to member-states, outline future goals of 
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the Arctic Council and the means to achieve those goals.177 Other meetings often occur with 
other, lower level diplomats throughout the year and are often related to specific reports, news, 
or developments. Meetings like these enables states to stay on the same page on the issues 
researched and studied by the Arctic Council’s Working Groups. The Arctic Council’s Working 
Groups are tailor made departments mandated and funded by the Arctic Council to address 
specific issues as they develop and to provide information to the Arctic Council’s member-states 
and the public in the form of detailed reports.178 These reports then form the basis of Arctic 
Council policy recommendations within Arctic Council Meetings following their publication, 
and have historically formed the basis of the three legally binding Arctic Council resolutions on 
issues such as Search and Rescue Operations and Fisheries Conservation. Both the Arctic 
Council Meetings and the Arctic Council Working Groups form the two most important features 
of the Arctic Council as the primary interactive portions of the Arctic Council with its member-
states, serving as vehicles to unify member-state policies throughout the region.  
Given the historic interests within the region, notably territorial disputes and Arctic 
based-national identities, it is important to identify a proper timescale for studying Arctic 
relations and interactions. For the purposes of this research though, it is important to begin with 
the enforcing of the Montreal Protocol which began in 1989.179 This timeframe enables a ready 
examination of the development of scientific diplomacy related to the environment between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, the founding of the Arctic Council, and the new way 
forward on climate protection which saw its foundation within the Protocol. For the purposes of 
the analysis in the case studies, this period of nearly thirty years will be divided into decades 
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based around pivotal events in regards to the relationship of Arctic Council member-states; the 
1996 founding of the Arctic Council, the 2004 publication of the first Arctic Climate Report, and 
the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis.  As explored within the following case studies, each of these events 
was precipitated with specific policy goals rooted in the inclinations and national identity of each 
state. Moreover, these events affected member-states on key issues related to the Arctic and 
prompted a relative transformation of those affected policies. Thus, defining the three decades 
since 1989 along the lines of these Arctic-critical events is both imperative and justified for the 

















THE TRUE NORTH STRONG AND FREE: CANADA AND THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 
Of the most militaristic and nationalistic concerning the Arctic Region, it is appropriate to 
begin first with the nation where the idea of the Arctic Council was first incepted; Canada. The 
Arctic has held a paramount role in developing Canadian national identity, the most readily 
available place to observe such importance is in the Canadian National Anthem which labels the 
state as the “true North, strong a free.”180The oddity when concerning politics in Ottawa and 
other provinces south of the Arctic Circle though is the percentage of Canadians who have 
visited the Canadian Arctic is shockingly low given this Arctic importance.181 Therefore, before 
delving into the various periods of interest to this case study it is vital to contextualize the 
importance of the Arctic in Canadian politics both within the consciousness of the Canadian 
Government and the Canadian Populace as a whole.  
Historically, the Canadian Government has pursued policies to support Arctic ambitions 
resonant with their constituents mainly in line with the view of the Arctic as a potential wealth 
generator and the declaration of the Northwest Passage as an internal Canadian waterway. 
Throughout Canadian history, the regions surrounding the Arctic Circle have drawn in citizens 
and government officials to exploit natural resources. Discoveries in the northern reaches of 
Canada of profitable goods such as furs, gold, timber, and oil ripe for the taking by enterprising 
entrepreneurs have continually provoked Canadian policies regarding the Arctic region.182 And 
just as was the case historically, today the Arctic region holds a great degree of promise as a 
realm to make Ottawa wealthy from resources extracted from under the seabed to making other 
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regions of provinces accessible for trade year-round for the first time in Canadian history.183 
Thus, the Arctic for the Canadian government can in part be viewed as a new revenue stream to 
finance other Canadian ambitions. Besides the draw of the potential natural riches of the Arctic, 
the Arctic holds prominence to the Canadian government due to the declaration of the Northwest 
Passage as an internal Canadian Waterway and Canada’s history of territory disputes with its 
neighbors in the Arctic region.184 Shockingly few of these disputes have been resolved with 
several of them being placed on the backburner simply due to the inaccessibility of the Arctic. 
Oddly enough, Canada’s great relationship with its immediate neighbors of the United States and 
Greenland is quite warm on dozens of other issues. Yet, in terms of Canadian politics these 
territory disputes are galvanizing for the government, having historically propelled Canadian 
political parties to success in national elections.185 In short, the restatements of Arctic territorial 
disputes have served to galvanize Canadian national sentiment or otherwise securitize a central 
aspect of Canadian national sentiment to increase buy-in from constituents into new policies. 
Thus, Ottawa and Canadian political parties hold the Arctic in high esteem as a realm central to 
its ambitions, either as fuel for the fires of the economy or as a means to increase popular support 
for political ideas.  
As previously mentioned the Canadian Arctic features quite heavily in Canadian national 
identity; however, in terms of the average Canadian citizen it is important to note aspects more 
usually readily divorced from conventional aspects of state power. Predominantly, this relates to 
the Canadian northern wilderness as a place for conservation. Most Canadians, though they have 
not visited the Canadian Arctic, can express an appreciation for the Wilds of Canada’s northern 
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reaches.186 This idea of the Canadian frontier has featured strongly in Canada historically, and 
today is mostly made up of vacationers visiting more rural, often forested parts of Canada. This 
coupled with pushes towards conservation of species like the Polar Bear and Arctic Seal, has led 
to a strong desire to preserve the Arctic environment and conserve its species as best as possible 
within the Canadian populace.187 The push towards conservation began in the 1970’s and today 
has led to the entrenchment of an identity of stewardship for the northern reaches of North 
America, including the Arctic, among the Canadian population.188  
Both the Canadian government and the Canadian population have entrenched ideas about 
the Arctic region. While oddly competing with each other, these ideas are central to the policy 
pursuits of Canada. Having briefly examined how the Arctic factors into Canadian identity for 
the Canadian government and populace it’s now possible to delve into the case study in regards 
to the interactions and effectiveness of the Arctic Council in altering Canadian national policies 
since 1989. This period of nearly 30 years shall be divided into three sections based around the 
central issues and watershed events for each decade; the 1996 Founding of the Arctic Council, 
the 2004 Publication of the Arctic Climate Report, and the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis.  
The Founding of the Council 
The late 1980’s quickly developed into a whirlwind of events, one specific set of events 
for the relationship of the Soviet Union and the West was within scientific research and action to 
prevent the expansion of the hole in the Ozone Layer. The Montreal Protocol, the final 
agreement related to this discussion among the global community, set the tone for the rest of the 
1990’s alongside the collapse of the Soviet Union as a time for new connections between the 
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former Eastern Bloc and the West.189 Particularly, the idea of an international organization 
principally concerned with the Arctic region stemmed from the various scientific agreements 
launched during the period of the late 1980’s and would become the Arctic Council in 1996.190 
Therefore, it is important to detail Canada’s major concerns for the region before 1996, next 
examine how the Arctic Council’s Founding affected those concerns, before finally detailing the 
new policy direction for Canadian foreign policy for the remainder of the decade.  
Initially, one of the primary concerns of Canadian foreign policy leading into the 1990’s 
was maintaining the momentum on scientific research and conservation from the 1980’s 
prompting Canada to propose eventually propose the Arctic Council. Canada’s willingness to 
support such an initiative was simultaneously an attempt to further conservation goals, especially 
in the adoption of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy by the Canadian Government in 
1991, yet it also served to fulfill other national objectives for Canada.191 The discussions related 
to the Strategy began in September 1989 directly as a result of the Montreal Protocol, focusing 
on the study of the Arctic environment and conservation of the unique species calling the region 
home.192 Domestically, in 1991 Canada established the Canadian Polar Commission via the 
Canadian Polar Commission Act of 1991 to assist the Canadian Ministry of Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs develop policy recommendations for the Canadian government, disseminate 
information related to Canadian Arctic affairs, and collecting information related to the Canadian 
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Arctic.193 This high level of concern for the Arctic environment fits into overall Canadian 
identity as stewards of the Northern Reaches of North America while also fitting into 
international cooperative agreements like Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy.  
The Strategy would go on to be critical to the development of the Arctic Council, as the 
Council was declared in AEPS’s Inuvik Declaration in 1996.194 Founded under the leadership of 
Ottawa, the Arctic Council was essentially viewed by the Canadian government as the means to 
achieve several critical policy objectives in line with how Canadians viewed the Arctic since the 
Montreal Protocol.195 As outlined in the Ottawa Declaration of 1996, the Arctic Council was 
principally established as an international forum to fulfill the broader environmental and 
development objectives of AEPS while simultaneously providing a research forum for the eight 
Arctic states to discuss issues wholly unique to the High North.196 Moreover, with the signing of 
the Ottawa Declaration Canada was enshrined as the first of Chairman of the Arctic Council, 
giving Canada the ability to set the agenda of the Arctic Council for its first two years.197 Given 
the Canadian feeling of environmental stewardship in the Arctic domestically, these various 
actions of Canada within its foreign environmental and conservation policies are not surprising. 
At the conclusion of Canada’s first tenure as Chairman of the Arctic Council Canada oversaw 
the first expansions of the Council into a variety of working groups geared towards specific 
issues ranging from environmental protections, climate research, and conservation.198 Beyond 
this, the Canadian tenure prioritized developing the Arctic region sustainably in both terms of the 
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general Arctic economy to the human capital of the region.199 As Ottawa has a history of viewing 
the Arctic as a potential economic bolster this is unsurprising, and the pursuit of these 
environmental policies is wholly in line with Canadian Arctic thinking. Therefore, for Canada 
this pivotal period of the 1990’s with the inception of the Arctic Council is an evolution 
increasingly in favor of conservation, environmentalism, and scientific research to make them 
both happen.  
Following the conclusion of the first Canadian Chairmanship, Canada maintains and 
supports the various environmental objectives of the new American Chairmanship from 1998-
2000. The US policies coincided with nearly all of the Canadian policy objectives related to 
environmental concerns and the propagation of human capital developments in the region, 
prompting a somewhat steady amount of Canadian support for the Council and its objectives.200 
The end of the 1990’s saw several reaffirming actions within Canada domestically to support the 
various environmental and conservation initiatives of the Arctic Council with legislation like the 
Canadian Environmental Protections Act of 1999.201 Furthermore, Canada had taken a vested 
interest in maintaining the overall health of the Arctic region through the publication of various 
reports and recommendations like the Canadian Arctic Contaminants Assessment Report in 1997 
by Environment and Climate Change Canada and the passage of the Mackenzie Valley Resource 
Management Act of 1998 by the Canadian Parliament202. Moreover, the intensifying 
environmental provisions and positioning of Canadian policy during this period made a lasting 
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impression, empowering the Canadian government to address pollution and preserve the 
environment of Northern Canada.  
For Ottawa, the 1990’s represented the culmination of several policy goals fitting in line 
with Canadian national opinion and identity as stewards of the Arctic environment. Having 
examined how this pivotal decade served to promote Canadian environmental policy while 
providing for a larger international framework geared towards conservation oriented policy. The 
undercurrent of conservation, environmentalism, and climate research has remained, for Canada 
other areas of Arctic Policy have pushed their way to the forefront in Ottawa.  
A Council of Action 
The 2000’s were viewed as an opportunity for Canada to continue on its environmentalist 
trajectory and to continue to support its ongoing projects. While those projects continued and 
expanded throughout the 2000’s, this decade was also marked with significant shifts and changes 
to other aspects of Canada’s Arctic policies. The primary event for this period for interactions 
between Canada and the Arctic Council was the publication of the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment and therefore it is critical to detail the general policy trend of Canada before 2004, 
the immediate impact of the 2004 Arctic Climate report, and how Arctic policies transformed 
after 2004.  
Initially, Canadian policies related to the Arctic region prior to 2004 were similar to the 
previous decade and coincided with broader Arctic Council goals. Canadian policy continued a 
trajectory towards environmental sustainability and conservation through the enactment of 
several pieces of legislation and the subsequent founding of new regulatory administrations. Of 
particular note for the Canadian Arctic and sub-Arctic regions, are several Annual Reports from 




economic Assessment Act.203 Both of these items discuss various items of devolved power from 
Ottawa to the local indigenous peoples and the provinces respectively on issues like human 
development, sustainable development, and environmental management, fitting in line with 
broad goals from the Arctic Council related to indigenous representation and environmental 
management. Other than these environmental ambitions, Canada as a whole was growing 
increasingly concerned with its economic sovereignty within the warming Canadian 
Archipelago, due to its ongoing disputes related to the status of the Northwest Passage as a 
Canadian Waterway.204 Beyond this growing concern, Canada maintained its various cordial 
territorial disputes with its neighbors and its military readiness for Arctic operations through a 
variety of training operations.205 All of these various policies and actions stayed true to the 
national perceptions of the Arctic in Canada; however, the visibility of the Arctic in Canadian 
politics was soon to be transformed.  
2004 was a dramatic year for the Arctic Council and its relationship with its members and 
the international community. For Canada it was a time period where Canadian territorial disputes 
made international headlines. Canada’s ongoing territorial disputes with its neighbors never had 
a great degree of international attention, having a relatively minor impact on its relationship with 
them and amounting to no true concerns among policy makers as other Arctic issues continually 
superseded them.206 However, in March of 2004 the Canadian government and populace began 
in earnest to discuss the status of Canada’s military and those territorial disputes. March ended 
with debate in the Canadian Parliament over budgetary allotments to the Canadian Military, with 
Conservative MP Stockwell Day making note of Arctic Territorial Disputes as a means of 
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highlighting the incumbent government’s lax military spending following the 9/11 Terrorist 
Attacks.207 By the end of the month, the Canadian military would have made international 
headlines for carrying out training operations surrounding Hans Island, a center of Canada’s 
ongoing territorial dispute with Denmark and the only real dispute regarding land in the 
Arctic.208 Operation Narwhal 04 took a small contingent of the Canadian military into the Arctic 
as a simple annual drill to maintain military readiness and familiarity with Arctic conditions; 
however, within a week it had made international headlines which termed the dispute the Hans 
Island “Whisky War” with Denmark.209 Though the Whisky War was a conflict which consisted 
of the placement of flags and alcohol by the Danish and Canadian militaries, it brought to light 
the ongoing territorial disputes Canada held with its neighbors to the international community. 
This event would achieve more significance in just a few short years to come as an indication of 
the politicization of the Arctic for the Conservative Party of Canada. By November 2004 the 
publication of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment put the Arctic Council and the state of the 
Arctic climate into the households of states all around the globe.210 The ACIA described the 
ongoing climate issues within the Arctic region and the dangers a warming Arctic posed to the 
various species calling the region home. This was one of the first reports which broadcast the 
effects of climate change to the world at large and succeeded in garnering the attention of the 
international community to the problems and tribulations facing the Arctic and how the Arctic 
Council was attempting to regulate, monitor, and confront those issues. Importantly, the 
Assessment made sure to note the retreat of Arctic Sea Ice and how it was projected to continue 
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to decline in the midst of a warming regional clime.211 By and large, the ACIA would attract a 
great deal of concern related to environmentalism within Canada and thereby promote a further 
commitment to environmental policy goals, it also served as an early sign that the Arctic may 
become economically viable in the years to come.  
The events of 2004 marked a significant turning point for Canadian public policy and 
perception of the Arctic, but the more significant developments for the region would be to come 
in just a few years. By and large the Canadian government continued its large pushes towards the 
development of its northern provinces as economically viable zones with continual support to 
bodies like the such as Nunavut Implementation Panel and Yukon Environmental and Socio-
economic Assessment Board which were founded under prior legislation and continually 
published significant reports related to the conservation, health, and development efforts of the 
Canadian government.212 In terms of how Ottawa would begin to approach the Arctic question in 
other areas though, it is important to acknowledge the transformative election of 2006. Stephen 
Harper campaigned successfully for the Conservative Party in Canada in part on a platform 
concerned with the Arctic region and the territorial disputes Canada had within it, marking sure 
to reiterate those campaign promises of the defense of Canadian Sovereignty in the North in 
speeches in 2007, 2008, and 2010.213 This marks a significant turn for Canadian Arctic policy as 
while the environmental objectives were pursued the Canadian military began to prepare itself 
for more regular Arctic operations and patrols to reassert Canada’s claims, showing a divorce 
from prior action regarding policy priorities in the region.214 While not game changing within the 
region or for Canada’s relationship with its neighbors, the militarization of the Arctic is a policy 
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shift for Canada in the midst of the Arctic Council’s stressing of cooperation across several 
different Arctic Council Chairmanships. Moreover, this militarization and the notes of the ACIA 
regarding sea ice coverage reinforced economic perceptions of the Arctic. This opening up of the 
region to oceangoing travel potentially year-round attracted a great deal of interest both within 
the hydrocarbons industry but also from the prospective trade route which could be considered to 
be nearly wholly within Canadian waters.215 The insistence of the Northwest Passage being a 
Canadian waterway is significant especially in light of ongoing preparations to make ready the 
Canadian military for Arctic operations as part of the Canada First Defense Strategy of 2008.216 
As odd as these competing goals seem for Canada, each fits very well into Canadian national 
identity as both a steward of the Arctic environmentally and assert territorial claims regarding the 
Arctic.  
2004 represented a year of shifts for the Canadian people and government, and in fact the 
Arctic region as a whole. Prior to 2004, the Arctic Council was relegated as an organization not 
readily looked towards by the rest of the global community, and following 2004 the Arctic 
Council made waves regarding the progression of climate change in the most vulnerable 
environments of the world. By and large, Canada’s goals for the 2000’s fit into the broader 
context of the Arctic Council’s policy objectives by supporting the sustainable development of 
the Arctic Region’s human resources and continually studying the Arctic environment, yet there 
was still the reassertion of nationalistic identity within the militarization of the Canadian Arctic 
and the use of the region as a rallying cry for electoral purposes.  
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The Council in Crisis 
As the scientific community began to recognize the severity of the warming in the Arctic 
region and informed the world about it, the amount of interest in the Arctic region increased. 
This crescendo of interest in the Arctic was punctuated with a defining moment for the Arctic 
Council during this period being the Ukrainian Crisis of 2014. Though this event occurred 
outside of Arctic territory, it led to the boycott of that year’s Arctic Council meeting by both the 
United States and Canada.217 Thus, it is important to examine the interactions between Canada 
and the Arctic Council during this period in order to determine how national identity influenced 
Canadian policy first by detailing how the start of the decade began, then examining the 
immediate impact of the 2014 crisis on Canadian-Arctic Council relations, before finally 
detailing how the relationship has progressed following 2014.  
The opening of the 2010’s was the beginning of a new relationship between Canada and 
the Arctic Council, therefore it is important to discuss how Canadian policies gelled with broader 
Council goals and how Canada began its second tenure as Council Chair. Initially, throughout 
the Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish terms of Arctic Council Chair the council was committed 
to the environmental goals of years past.218 Each of these tenures saw major reports issued for 
the whole of the Arctic on environmental research, including the Arctic Biodiversity Trends 
Report of 2010.219 Moreover, the Swedish Chairmanship saw two of the three legally binding 
agreements of the Arctic Council issued, those two agreements being the Agreement on 
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic of 2013 and the 
Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic of 
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2011.220 In the meantime, Canada signed onto both of these agreements and began to issue new 
laws and regulations related to improving environmental conditions above the Arctic Circle. 
Notably, Canadian protected areas both on land and at sea began their largest expansion during 
this period, with most of those expansions occurring above the Arctic Circle.221 Moreover, 
Canada improved its environmental regulations with the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Act of 2012 in the midst of this time.222 Furthermore, Canada also continued the process of 
devolving governmental authority in the northern provinces of Canada in line with Arctic 
Council objectives of indigenous representation with the Nunavut Planning and Project 
Assessment Act of 2013.223 For the 2nd Canadian Tenure as Arctic Council Chair, the host of 
environmental programs begun previously were continued or expanded upon, with the 
implementation of the Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and methane 
Emissions Reductions and the creation of the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan for 2015-2025 being 
major highlights.224 However, the Canadian tenure differed on two key areas from prior 
Chairmanship plans in that it specifically makes reference to the development of “responsible 
arctic resource development” and the “establishment of safe arctic shipping.”225 While neither of 
these objectives are particularly surprising for the Arctic Council to focus on, their meshing with 
overall Canadian Arctic ambitions, identity, and the spike in interest within the region is 
something rather new. All of this broadly fits into the aspect of Canada as an environmental 
steward to the Arctic, but it also coincides with military spending and economic development 
projects for the Canadian Arctic. Of greatest controversy was the announcement of the awarding 
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of contracts for a small fleet of Arctic Patrol Vessels in 2011.226 While these vessels were argued 
to be necessary under the Harper Administration, their ballooning cost of construction attracted a 
phenomenal amount of ire from the opposition party and the Canadian populace.227 Additionally, 
the Canadian military maintained its annual Arctic exercises without as great a deal of attention 
as in 2004.228  While the economic development of the Arctic for this time was linked to 
generalized Arctic Council objectives, the Canadian government pursued no expansions of 
ongoing policies.  
The Russian Federation’s actions in Ukraine are interesting especially in the context of 
Arctic Council relations. The destabilization of Ukraine through Russian action in Eastern 
Ukraine brought about a host of criticism from the globe, including Canada.229 Shortly following 
the immediate start of the crisis in March of 2014, there was to be a brief meeting of the Arctic 
Council to be held in April by Russia in Moscow.230 In response to the beginning of the Crisis, 
the Harper Administration of Canada announced Canada, then the Chair of the Council, would 
be boycotting the meeting to protest Russian action in Ukraine.231 Shortly thereafter, the United 
States announced it would be boycotting the meeting as well in solidarity with Canada. While 
not groundbreaking as far as policy has been concerned for the Arctic Council, the two most 
powerful Western states on the council first boycotting a meeting in Russia did serve to put the 
Arctic Council in the news again. While this was the first time in which a member state did 
boycott a meeting of the Council, ultimately there was no dramatic effect to Council relations.232 
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Yet, it serves as an interesting example of when broader Canadian policy influenced its 
relationship with the Council while it was Council Chair.  
The aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis served to highlight how Canada’s relationship 
with the Arctic Council interacts with broader Canadian policy and Canadian identity as a whole, 
and this is relevant in the years after 2014. Most notably, Canada continued to purse nationalistic 
policies in line with Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future 
published in 2009.233 This strategy outlines four central pillars in terms of how Canadian policy 
will be organized to engage the Arctic region in the following order of importance; sovereignty 
assertion, economic development, environmental protection, and northern governance.234 This 
essential roadmap of Canadian policy follows the objectives laid out by the Arctic Council in 
terms of including terms of development for the economic, environmental, and representation for 
indigenous peoples; however, the prioritization of sovereignty issues for Canada is not surprising 
given the level of international interest within the region. Since 2010 the number of observer 
states on the Arctic Council has grown to include China and India, with a great deal of interest 
being levied towards the Northwest Passage as an international trade route.235 Canada has 
maintained a host of policies geared towards the latter three pillars of its Arctic Strategy, 
including new environmental protect legislation and signing the Agreement to Prevent 
Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean to preserve the Arctic environment 
as much as possible.236 Though environmental programs progress as they had for Canada before, 
new programs emerged to support the economic development of the northern Canadian 
provinces. In 2018 Ottawa launched Strategic Investments in Northern Economic Development 
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(SINED), a program designed to bolster the economic growth, diversity, and activity of northern 
Canada by offering governmental support for those endeavors committed to economically 
develop Canada’s Northern provinces.237 Though all of this complies with Canadian ideas about 
the Arctic region from stewardship to exploitation, the nationalistic aspects of Arctic sovereignty 
for Canada have steadily gained ground. While Canada and Denmark did announce in 2018 to 
meet in order to resolve the Hans Island dispute, Canada has continued to maintain strong 
policies related to rebuilding the Canadian Armed Forces to more effectively operate within the 
Arctic region in order to protect Canadian Arctic sovereignty.238 The principle objectives of the 
2010 Arctic Integrating Concept from the Harper Administration was held over by the Trundeau 
Administration, including the bolstered readiness of Canadian Armed forces to act within the 
Arctic region.239 While not completely militaristic as with increased Arctic traffic there will be a 
need to carry out more search and rescue operations in the region and to support scientific 
research. This duality is most clearly observed within the 2016 expansion of the Nunavut 
Training Centre to become a hub for Canadian Arctic operations potentially year-round, which 
coincides with the announcement for the hope of opening more training locations and military 
bases within the Canadian Arctic by the Canadian Armed Forces in accordance with the opening 
of several other Arctic facilities by Russia.240 While the overall goals of the troops does fit within 
the broader context of Arctic Council goals, the increased support for Canadian Arctic operations 
does fit within the broader context of Canadian national identity and the securitization of Arctic 
sovereignty, specifically related to the defending powerful identity markers like the Northwest 
Passage. In sum, the period following the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis has been full of diverse actions 
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by Canada in both putting forth policies to protect the Arctic environment while supporting its 
economic development and pursuing cooperative policies in the international community in the 
midst of developing the military capabilities to protect territorial sovereignty.  
The 2010’s have been a whirlwind for Canadian Arctic Policy. The Ukrainian Crisis of 
2014 clearly demonstrates the Canada’s policy concerns in other areas of foreign policy can 
influence its interactions within the Arctic Council. Throughout this whole decade, as in the 
previously examined decades, Canadian policy has conformed to the general thrust of Canadian 
national identity which prioritizes environmental stewardship, preservation of national 
sovereignty, and economic development.  
Case Study Conclusions 
Since 1989 Canadian policy has shown a ready prioritization of Arctic Climate concerns, 
readily meeting the various touch-points of Arctic Council goals. The general trend of Canadian 
policy does heartily coincide with Canadian national identity, but over time Canadian national 
policies have become increasingly concerned with Canadian objectives related to traditional hard 
power related to economic development and military power is rising to the top of Canada’s 
policy hierarchy. In the midst of these policies, Canada has remained an ever supportive member 
of the Arctic Council and done its due diligence to meet the Council goals related to 






THE POLAR BEAR: RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 
The state with the most significant Arctic Coastline and the largest amount of people 
living above the Arctic Circle is naturally the Russian Federation. For Russians, the Arctic is an 
important symbol of national identity, expansion, and bold exploration, which all harkens back to 
the periods of expansion from throughout Russian history and tradition.241 The Arctic has lain on 
the thoughts and minds of modern Russian politicians, scientists, and military professionals 
because of the power possibilities and options provided by the region.242 Today, those territorial 
claims persist in the Arctic Ocean and the Arctic holds a special place in the minds of both 
Russian policy makers and the Russian populace as a critical realm for the future of the Russian 
state because it is simultaneously an access point to the rest of the world, a means of economic 
development, and a realm of cooperation.  
Initially for Russia and Russians, the Arctic represents a lifeline to the rest of the world. 
The ports of call Russia has on the Barents Sea are capable of handling a range of vessels from 
Russia’s blue-water navy to merchant fishing vessels, representing some of the most robust port 
facilities in the region.243 Moreover, the Russian northern coast remains open for longer than the 
other coastlines of the Arctic Ocean, enabling for a longer traveling season in the Northeast 
Passage than the Northwest Passage.244 This interaction between Russians and the Arctic Ocean 
stretches back in time as well; the modern deep U-shaped hull design of modern icebreakers was 
first brought into being from Russian adaptations of the vessels of indigenous northern 
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peoples.245 With the introduction of global warming into the equation and the reduction of sea-
ice thickness, the Arctic is readily being viewed as the next critical means for global economic 
transportation and is being hyped as such within the Russian government.246 In sum, for Russia 
and Russians the Arctic Ocean was, is, and is becoming a highway to transport goods from one 
part of the country to the other.  
Just as was the case with Canada, for Russia the Arctic has become increasingly viewed 
as the means towards economic prosperity and development. As previously mentioned the Arctic 
holds vast reserves of oil and natural gas, and there are several states with significant interests in 
tapping into those deposits with Russia essentially leading the charge.247 The geologic 
morphology of the Arctic seabed has a great deal of the oil and natural gas reserves squarely 
within Russian territory, and Russia has been willing to exploit those resources for their own 
gain.248 Surprisingly, such action is applauded by Russians as a means to restore Russia to the 
status of a superpower in the international arena, much like the challenging of the United States 
on international issues.249 To that end, the Kremlin has made it a priority to develop the Russian 
Arctic into an economically active region to the benefit of the Russian economy and to further 
propagate their on popularity at home.  
Finally, there is still a great deal of scientific interest for Russia and Russians in regards 
to the Arctic, related to conservation and environmentalism. During the Soviet Period, Russia 
and Russians approached environmentalism as an unnecessary luxury or inhibitor on the 
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economic progress of the state.250 Today, those same beliefs largely hold true. Though there has 
been some push towards environmental consciousness on the part of Russian policymakers, 
domestic organizations, and local people, unfortunately environmental concerns are not nearly as 
important to Russians as with other members of the Arctic Council as a great deal of the Russian 
environmentalist movement requires outside support.251 However, the acknowledgement of the 
desires of other states within the region related to environmentalism has led Russian policy to 
primarily push for cooperation with the West on such issues in order to build critical cooperative 
bridges.252 Thus, though there is some importance within the region in regarding environmental 
efforts and study, for Russia and Russians there simply is not the same push for 
environmentalism as within other states.  
The Arctic remains an integral part of Russian identity, though it fundamentally differs in 
its approach to the region compared to other Arctic states. Regardless though, the perspectives of 
the Kremlin and the Russian people serve to frame the policy approaches of the region and can 
offer unique insights into the Russian relationship with the Arctic Council.  
Cooperation of the Post-Cold War 
 For the Russian Federation, the Arctic represents an interesting area of cooperation with 
the West. This stretches back to the Soviet period prior to 1989, with the settlement of the 
maritime border between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Bering Strait.253 In a 
speech in Murmansk in 1987, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev set the tone for the interactions 
between the West and the Soviet Union in relation to the Arctic as a region of cooperative study 
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and research by outlining the Soviet Union’s Arctic Policy.254 This spirit of goodwill towards 
mutual climate research set a tone for environmental cooperation between the West and the 
Soviet Union which is best explored centered around the 1990’s and the founding of the Arctic 
Council in 1996. In order to explore this period it is critical to first outline the general Russian 
and Soviet policies related to the Arctic Council before 1996, then detail how 1996 led to 
immediate changes within those policies, before finally looking to the impact the Council had on 
Russian policy following the immediate effects of 1996.  
As the Soviet Union wavered and then collapsed, an important part of its legacy to the 
newly formed Russian Federation came in the form of its engagement in Arctic agreements 
related to climate study and conservation. The Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation, 
supported the ideas related to the Montreal Protocol, applying those rules within its borders to 
help facilitate the preservation of the ozone layer.255 The Soviet Union joined other Arctic states 
in signing onto the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy spearheaded by Finland to further 
study the impacts of climate change and pollution on the Arctic Ocean.256 For the Russian and 
prior Soviet government, this continual interaction and cooperation in the Arctic space was 
viewed as a major cooperative boon to the overall relationship between itself and the West. To 
further this end, Moscow engaged in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Barents Regional 
Council in 1993 in order to facilitate cooperation to develop the Barents Sea region, which is one 
of the most populous and economically active portions of the Russian Arctic.257 Furthermore, in 
1993 Russia and Norway negotiated to increase the scope and scale of the Joint Norwegian-
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Russian Fisheries Commission to include long-term fishery conservation as part of a broader 
effort of cooperation and conservation in the Arctic.258 All of these actions coincide with how the 
Russian people and government approached the Arctic region, as a realm necessary to interact 
with in order to cooperate with their neighbors and to engage on advancing scientific knowledge 
of the Arctic.  
With this in mind, 1996 becomes a continuation of this engagement with the West over 
the Arctic, especially with the founding of the Arctic Council. For Moscow, the Arctic Council 
represented an opportunity to engage with the West to simultaneously achieve several goals 
related to its Arctic policies. As previously mentioned, the Murmansk Speech of 1987 outlined 
Soviet Arctic policy and Russian Arctic policy by 1996 were quite similar, the most important 
issue areas for the Russian government and people concerning the Arctic were the economic 
development of the Russian Arctic, the fostering of cooperation between Russia and the West, 
and the sharing of scientific research across members.259 To this end, the Arctic Council was a 
major boon to Russia as it enabled a clear road forward on each of these issues through the 
various working groups of the Council. Therefore, for the Russian government and to a degree 
the Russian people the Arctic Council represented a means to better develop, access, and interact 
with both the West and their northernmost regions as a continuation of prior, successful policies.  
The latter half of the 1990’s were a continuation of previous policies enacted by the 
Russian federation, with a continued focus on developing a cooperative relationship with 
Western states and some rising usage of international institutions to resolve territorial disputes. 
Initially, Russia remained committed to cooperating with the West at nearly every opportunity 
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afforded to it by joining the Northern Dimension in 1999 alongside Iceland, Norway, and the 
European Union to facilitate cooperation among European Arctic States by engaging in a midst 
of policy areas through its own working groups similar to the same objectives pushed by the 
Arctic Council in areas such as environmental issues, public health and well-being, 
transportation logistics, and culture.260 This correlation to Arctic Council objectives is not 
without warrant as every state signing onto the Northern Dimension is also a member of the 
Arctic Council, save the European Union, thereby enabling Russia to institutionally double dip 
on areas of major concern for policy objectives. In the midst of this re-engagement period 
between Russia and the West, Moscow also ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Seas in 1997 to more effectively interact with its neighbors and the international 
community at large regarding Russia’s coastal waters.261 Each of these policies coincided with 
pushes towards furthering traditional policy views of the Arctic region and how the region could 
be used as a means of cooperation with the West on key issues.  
Thus, having examined the 1990’s it is clear the overall theme for Russian policy 
engagement with the Arctic Council remained continual cooperation with the West on key issues 
related to the Russian Arctic. By and large the traditional ideas of economic exploitation and a 
hyperborean manifest destiny remained prominent in the minds of Russian policy makers and 
citizens, yet those ideas were pushed to the side in favor of utilizing the Arctic as a broader 
means of engagement with the West on communal issues.  
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A New Millennium for a New Russia 
The Russian Federation entered into the 21st Century with a relatively new President 
with a new vision for the future. Despite the change in leadership and century, overall policy 
objectives for Moscow remained congruent with the policies of previous years. As the 2000’s 
advanced and the impacts of climate change became more apparent with the publication of the 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, the ordering of the priorities of the Russian Federation began 
to change. To best examine this transformation of Russian policy in the first decade of the 21st 
Century it is critical to examine what how Russia interacted with the Arctic Council prior to 
2004, how 2004 altered Russian policy approaches to the Arctic, and finally consider how 
Russian policy changed in the latter half of the decade.  
The start of the 21st Century can be described as a mixture of a continuation of the policy 
decisions from the previous decade and new concerns related to the restoration of economic 
authority. First, within the international community Russia remained committed to the utilization 
of international institutional frameworks to facilitate the cooperative opportunities with former 
rivals. Notably, Russia remained committed to the variety of institutions it had joined in years 
previously, while also beginning to utilization of institutional frameworks to resolve ongoing 
issues. Particularly, in 2001 the Russian government submitted case documents to UNCLOS in 
order to resolve its territorial claims in the Arctic Ocean.262 This action in particular leads into 
the next important development for Russian foreign policy for the early 2000’s. The Russian 
economy had been in shambles throughout the 1990’s and the primary focus of Moscow in the 
early 2000s was to regain lost economic ground. As a consequence of this, items like 
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environmental policy began to languish under the weight of the decentralization of the 1990’s 
with no real domestic environmental code enforcement due to continual governmental 
reshuffling.263 Fortunately, this period also began to see the tide turning on this environmental 
issue with the passing of the 2002 Federal Law on Technical Regulation in actually creating the 
start of an adequate framework for the enforcement of environmental regulations.264 Though this 
seems off in comparison to the traditional objectives of the Russian people and government, 
during the early 2000’s the quality of the environment of Russia degraded to the point where 
80% of Russian citizens began to implore their government to take action to combat pollution 
and environmental degradation.265 Therefore, though there was not a significant amount of 
interesting interaction with the Arctic Council during this period, broader Russian policy was 
congruent with Arctic Council goals.  
For Russian policy, the most significant year in the 2000’s was by far the year 2004 
because it represented the first time Russia would be the Chair of the Arctic Council and the 
publication of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Of all of the actions of the early 2000’s, 
the Russian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council stands out as a significant event due to the 
almost copy and pasted nature of several of Russia’s policy objectives. Notably a great deal of 
the objectives for the Russian Chairmanship were similar to previous chairmanship objectives 
related to increasing cooperation, council visibility, and scientific research with the introduction 
of events such as the International Polar Year.266 However, the initial Russian objectives also 
included several new clauses related to economic development and preparing the region for 
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international, transarctic shipping.267 The inclusion of the trade route objective in particular is a 
groundbreaking event as it represents the direct inclusion of policy objectives beneficial 
primarily to a single state into the council goals. Nevertheless, all of the policy objectives 
expressed by Russia during their chairmanship did fit with Russian ideas related to the Arctic 
and the broader developmental goals of the Arctic Council. Moreover, the publication of the 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment of 2004 was a groundbreaking publication for the Arctic 
Council’s international visibility and in the case of Russia was of no exception. For Russia, the 
Assessment represented an opportunity to re-engage with environmental policy and to begin to 
prepare for the economic exploitation of the Arctic. These paradoxical goals were relatively 
quickly seized upon, given the problems Russia faced earlier in the decade. In response to 
environmental concerns, Moscow began to rectify problems with its environmental regulatory 
framework by strengthening water management, forest codes, and improving resource 
protections related to the marine environment.268 In regards to beginning to examine the 
economic opportunities of the Arctic, Russia began to more readily consider oil exploration in 
the region to further bolster the Russian economy within its declared Arctic policies.269 All of 
this is again wholly congruent with the nationalistic approaches of Russia in regards to the Arctic 
as a region. 2004 highlighted the paradoxes of Russia’s actions regarding the Arctic and overall 
Arctic Council objectives, yet more changes and challenges for Russia were to come.  
Following 2004’s publication of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and the start of 
Russia’s Arctic Council Chairmanship had lasting impacts on the policies concerning the Arctic 
region. In the latter half is best broadly characterized by the continuation of cooperation and the 
resurgence of economic nationalism. First, the continued institutional cooperation pursued by 
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Russia was extremely telling during this time, and in no other area is it best observed in the 
Salekhard Declaration. The Salekhard Declaration concluded the Russian Chairmanship of the 
Arctic Council, describing the success of the various Arctic Council initiatives pursued during its 
tenure including the establishment of the Arctic Contaminants Action Program, the successful 
integration of Barents Euro-Arctic Council’s Working Group on Environment into Arctic 
Council activities related to environmental protections, and the successful gathering of the 
Moscow Symposium on Prevention and Mitigation Of Emergency Situations in the Arctic.270 
The most important exclusion from the Salekhard Declaration was the item related to preparing 
the Arctic region as a hub for trade which was included in the Chairmanship Priority paper from 
2002, instead the only mention of maritime activity in the Arctic strictly relates to working group 
projects studying the possibility of pollution in the region in the Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment draft.271 Removing such an important and long-lasting piece of Russian policy goals 
shows a significant development to fulfill communal goals as Council Chair instead of individual 
ones by the end of Russia’s Council Chair tenure. However, such inclinations were not 
completely absent in general Russian policy. In 2008 Russia engaged in the Arctic Ocean 
Conference, a meeting outside of the Arctic Council, alongside every other Arctic coastal state 
held in Greenland.272 Ultimately, this meeting decreed unanimously in the Ilulissat Declaration 
every state with territorial disputes should pursue bilateral negotiations in order to resolve their 
disputes instead of pursuing multilateral resolutions to often longstanding territorial claims.273 
These policies are completely in line with how the Russian government and people have 
approached the Arctic region, and the idea of Arctic as a tool to achieve great power status once 
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more. In the years after 2004, Russia began to seriously pursue undersea exploration within the 
Arctic region and pursuing oil exploration off of the Russian northern coast. This led to the 
publicized Russian flag planting on the Lomonosov ridge in 2007 by the Arktika 2007 
expedition, correlating with modifications to Russian submissions to UNCLOS regarding 
Russian territorial claims.274 Furthermore, Russia continued support its development of Arctic 
Oil reserves during this period to enhance these strategic resources for Russia. Following 2004 
China began to develop interests in the Arctic, partnering with Russia to finance oil exploration 
in off of the northern coast of Siberia.275 Each of these events received some international outcry 
related to the potential pollution of oil into the delicate Arctic environment and the inflammatory 
possibilities of Russian flag planting on the Arctic seabed; however, on a whole these actions 
were popular domestically and not breaking stride with the Arctic Council’s broader objectives 
of conservation, scientific research, and economic development.  
The first decade of the 21st century was a significant one for the Russian Federation. 
Russian policy ideas related to cooperation with the West were pursued concurrent with policies 
to enrich the Russian state and people. Ultimately, this was a decade of paradoxes for Russia, 
beginning with strengthening environmental protections and ending with the beginning of the 
exploitation of a unique, fragile environment it had pledged to protect. Yet, these actions were 
applauded by Russians and fit snuggly with Russian national identity in relation to the Arctic.  
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A Self-Inflicted Crisis 
By the early 2010’s the Russian Federation had continued to engage in the same manner 
of agreements it had always pursued in regards to the Arctic. Unfortunately though, its actions in 
Eastern Europe would come back to haunt Moscow’s Arctic ambitions. To best examine how 
these actions in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea impacted Russian Arctic policy it is 
critical to first detail how the decade began for Moscow in the Arctic, then the immediate 
impacts of 2014’s Ukrainian Crisis, before finally investigating Russia’s policies following the 
crisis.  
Moscow’s policies related to the Arctic followed the same broad policy objectives from 
past decades, thus the start of the 2010’s can be considered to be a continuation of prior policy 
which is best observed within the maintained institutional cooperation for Russia and the 
continued focus on economic progress. The start of the 2010’s experienced a great degree of 
groundbreaking institutional norm creation with the Arctic Council passing two new legally 
binding resolutions for its members. The Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic of 2011 and the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine 
Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic of 2013 established new ground for the 
Arctic Council in regards to its members, as prior to these agreement the Council had no real 
authority to coerce its members into action one way or another.276 Russian compliance and 
participation with these two legally binding resolutions is significant, and when coupled with 
Moscow’s other policy expeditions into the Arctic highlight a cooperative streak in Russian 
policy. For instance, in 2010 Russia and Norway finally concluded their longstanding territorial 
dispute in the Barents Sea with the Barents Sea Treaty of 2010, a significant development and 
success of bilateral negotiations to resolve just one of the many territorial disputes Russia 
                                                      




possesses with its Arctic neighbors.277 Though Russia successfully settled that territorial dispute, 
her financing of various expeditions to serve other claims on the disputed Lomonosov Ridge and 
the expansion of the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone under UNCLOS adds fuel to the fire for 
ongoing Arctic Ocean territorial disputes.278 Each of these actions and events fits within the 
broader context of Russian policy and identity, serving to further highlight the cooperative 
objectives of Moscow and engage within power seeking behavior in line with previous Russian 
approaches to the region. This secondary focus on the Arctic as an area of power acquisition 
comes into much greater prominence during this period for the Russian government due to 
Russian oil extraction efforts and the action taken to secure the Northeast Passage. Initially, 
Moscow sought to increase the amount of oil extracted within the Arctic region by providing 
support for the efforts of state-majority-owned oil company Rosneft. Beginning in 2010 Rosneft 
sought to increase the amount of oil it produced within the region by funding the construction of 
the Obskaya-Bovanenkovo Pipeline and partnering with Exxon Mobile to secure increased 
funding for oil exploration in the Russian Arctic.279 In the midst of these efforts to secure access 
to the natural resources of the Arctic region, the Russian military also committed to developing 
the assets needed to secure economic prosperity in protecting the Northeast Passage such as the 
reopening of Soviet-era Naval installations throughout the Russian Arctic.280 Furthermore, the 
Russian navy resumed naval air patrols over the northern coast of Russia in order to more 
efficiently patrol the waterway alongside other activity to support the safety of the Northeast 
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Passage.281 These actions are helping to facilitate the transformation of the Russian Arctic Coast 
into a region regularly monitored and made safe for oceangoing traffic in order to secure what is 
perceived to be an avenue of economic prosperity in the eyes of the Russian government and 
people.282 Both sides of the duality of Russian action in the Arctic region during the early years 
of the 2010’s speak to actions pursued in order to meet the policy goals of the Russian 
Federation, with congruence to the broader goals of the Arctic Council.  
2014 served as a hallmark that Russia could not act with impunity without the West 
imposing sanctions upon them. Though the Ukrainian Crisis served to derail a great deal of the 
ongoing relationship between the West and Russia, the Arctic Council was insulated from this 
sanctioning process beyond the initial boycott by Canada and the United States.283 In order to 
more efficiently explore this it is critical analyze where the policy breakdowns where between 
the West and Russia over the Ukrainian crisis and where there were continuations in spite of the 
disagreements related to Ukraine. Initially, the most visible breakdown between the West and 
Russia was over the status of an Arctic Council Meeting to be held in Moscow just scant days 
following the beginning of the Ukrainian Crisis.284 Beyond this visible backlash against Russian 
action there was no immediate response from the Arctic Council in regards to the Crisis itself, 
yet it is critical to not that several key programs Russia had been previously preparing for 
floundered due to the implementation of sanctions against Russia from the West. Of greatest 
significance to Russia was the ceasing of much of the Western support for Russian oil 
exploration including the canceling of the previously mentioned Exxon-Rosneft discussion, the 
removal of Norwegian technological support for the construction of Arctic Off-shore oil rigs, and 
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overall Western coordination in regards to military readiness for Arctic operations.285 In the 
midst of this breakdown between Russia and the West, the Russian military continued to increase 
the militarization of the Russian Kola Peninsula in the Barents Sea to protect Russian Arctic 
interests.286 Though not solely for Arctic Operations, Moscow’s military build-up for the Arctic 
represented a major sticking point for Western relations which were amplified by the rest of 
Russia’s actions throughout Eastern Europe in 2014.287 Oddly enough though, other aspects of 
the relationship Russia held with the Arctic Council and with other Council members concerning 
the Arctic region remained unchanged beyond the sanctions. Of most shocking instance of 
continuation of cooperation between the Russian coast guard and their western counterparts over 
search and rescue in order to comply with pre-existing Arctic Council agreements.288 Beyond 
this particular highlight, there was continuing of the energy trade between Russia and European 
states, ongoing fishery negotiations with Norway, ongoing discussions related to Danish 
submissions to UNCLOS in regards to territorial claims on the Lomonosov Ridge, and the 
adopting of the Polar Code by the International Maritime Organization under the 
recommendation of the whole of the Arctic Council.289 So, though the Ukrainian Crisis derailed 
some of Russia’s more self-serving programs and policies it does not appear to have derailed the 
longest-lasting and most successful policy for the Arctic region: Arctic Cooperation. Thereby, 
the preservation of the overall Arctic vision of the Russian Federation and people is preserved in 
their actions with the West during the Ukrainian Crisis, because though there was significant 
pushback against Russia’s actions in Ukraine there was not a detrimental amount of derailment 
to Russia’s Arctic engagements.  
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The Russian Arctic Policy post-Ukrainian crisis is still a work in progress, but it has all of 
the trappings which have previously characterized the Arctic policies of Russia for both good 
and ill.  For Moscow the Arctic remains as it ever has been in the 21st century, a tool to return 
Russia to the might of bygone days and a means to facilitate cooperative engagement with the 
West.290 The Russian government has continually held the view the Arctic would become a 
means to redevelop the Russian economy to its Soviet-period heights, and to this end Moscow 
has continued to support the exploration of off-shore oilfields and other natural resources to 
exploit in the Arctic region just as it always has.291 Moreover, the Russian military has continued 
to expand its presence above the Arctic Circle by reopening continuing to reopen Soviet-era 
naval installations in order to provide births for the vessels projected to utilize the Russian 
Northeast Passage.292 Thus, the preparations of the Russian government has been making to 
transform their northernmost provinces into an economically active region have continued only 
slightly been setback by the events of 2014. As these nationalistic policies continue, Russia has 
also contributed to three significant developments of international cooperation which has been 
fostered by the Arctic Council. First, the Joint Russian-US funded and third legally binding 
Arctic Council resolution, the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific 
Cooperation of 2017, which Russia signed with all other Arctic Council members.293 Next, 
Russia continued its cooperation on search and rescue operations in line with its prior 
commitments to the Arctic Council both with its immediate neighbors and those further afield by 
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contributing to the establishment of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum in 2015.294 Finally, the 
actions bearing the most recent fruit from the relationship between the Arctic Council and 
Moscow have been regarding a variety of work related to fisheries management, from the 
Declaration on the Central Arctic Ocean in 2015 preventing the exploitation of the Arctic Ocean 
fisheries to the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic 
Ocean signed in October 2018 furthering the 2015 declaration.295 This focus on cooperation in 
the midst of preparing for military action in the Arctic is striking, and wholly in line with 
Russian views on the Arctic and broader Russian government policy towards its rivalry with the 
West.  
Though the end of the 2010’s at the time of writing is still somewhat far-off, the 
implementation of policies throughout this period reinforces the complexities of Russian action 
in the Arctic. On one hand Moscow habitually assists in communal goals and institutions while 
focusing on how it can best exploit the Arctic region to serve its own ends. One thing is 
seemingly certain throughout these policies; Russia will continue to pursue such policies it 
believes best serve its own interests as is the case with all states.  
General Trend  
Since 1989 Russia has experienced several extremes of instability, uncertainty, and 
crises; however, the Arctic policies of the Russian Federation have remained stable and 
consistent since they were first announced by Gorbachev in Murmansk in 1987. The push for 
cooperation with the West on scientific issues, environmentalism, and conservation have proven 
successful time and time again, with a variety of international institutions, laws, and norms 
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having been pushed forward by Russia and the West together. In the midst of it all, Russia still 
remains committed to restoring itself at least to its former might by utilizing the Arctic as a tool 







THE NEW ARCTIC NORMAL 
The general trends of both Russia and Canada point towards two states moving towards 
Arctic Council objectives in areas related to conservation and environmentalism while intensely 
pursuing national interests in other important areas of concern closely linked to their respective 
national identities. Therefore, with the completion of the reviews of the case studies of Russian 
and Canadian interactions with the Arctic Council since 1989, it is now possible to return to the 
null hypothesis of national identity does not limit the ability of the Arctic Council to alter state 
policies. Given the propensity of both Russia and Canada since the Cold War to continually 
pursue their own national interests in line with the popular conceptions of the Arctic as a region 
continually over the near entirety of the thirty year period, it is possible to reject the null 
hypothesis. This rejection is possible because conditions of national identity establish 
“untouchable” areas of interests for states; thereby, making it difficult for the Arctic Council to 
create inroads to alter policies affecting those interests.  
Thus, it is possible to return to the research question of under what conditions can the 
Arctic Council facilitate cooperative policy developments in its members? Utilizing the 
framework offered by the logic of habit and the importance of identity discourses related to 
international politics, it is clear national identity does play a role in influencing the effectiveness 
of the Arctic Council in propagating cooperative policies among its members. Conditions of 
strong national identity related to key interests cultivate “untouchable” zones for states, making it 
difficult for the Arctic Council to create inroads to alter policies affecting those interests. 
Essentially, the more closely held the specific national interest is to the identity of the state the 




leave the state in a weaker position then had not pursued the self-serving policy. This roadblock 
stems from the developed habits both on the part of government interactions with their 
constituents and government approaches to those same issues within the international community 
under the prevailing conditions of uncertainty.  
Together, the increase in fungibility with the propagation of untouchable areas of national 
policy by Council members causes the decline of the uniqueness of Arctic politics in critical 
areas of engagement between and among states. The encroachment of non-Arctic policies into 
the Arctic realm propagates zones of normalization between members of the Arctic Council 
despite the ongoing cooperation in areas where dissimilar national identities converge. Thus, in 
this case it is necessary to adopt Copeland’s framework for analyzing trade routes and the 
security of those routes impacts interstate relations in terms of geopolitics and continual ice 
decline.296  
The normalization of Arctic politics serves to also shed light on the motivations of the 
usage of national identity discourses as a framing device for national interests. Essentially, the 
nationalistic appeal towards the identity of their constituents serves as a legitimizing factor for 
the pursuit of national interests within the Arctic region. Observed within the context of the case 
studies, both Canada and Russia used domestic appeals towards national identity related to 
Arctic sovereignty in order to purposely propagate policy areas which could not be infringed 
upon by the Arctic Council. Thus, identity has become a rouse for national interests and is used 
to create untouchable zones closely affiliated with the national interests of the state. Given its 
widespread success in cultivating policy sticking points for international relations among Arctic 
states, governments have been falling back on national identity in order to justify not bowing 
down to the suggestions or agreements and in order to increase domestic support for incumbent 
                                                      




governments.297 Moreover, the creation of untouchable zones of policy for the Arctic Council is 
correlated to increased fungibility of national power related to decreases in the coverage of 
Arctic Ocean sea ice. As the ice has retreated, arguments regarding national identity have 
gathered steam and clout within their respective states, fueled in some cases by governmental 
rhetoric, while those same states have continued to act in their own best interests regarding the 
region. Therefore it is critical to acknowledge the usage of national identity as a means to 
increase popular support for the state pursuit of national interests.298 
To better understand how the influence of national identity couple with increased 
fungibility generates a normalization of Arctic regional politics it is critical to first offer a more 
in-depth exploration of the creation of untouchable policy zones, next detail how the process of 
normalization is usurping traditional Arctic habits, then examine the impact of normalization on 
critical areas, before finally offering a forecast for the future of international relations in the 
Arctic. 
The Creation of Untouchable Zones 
The coupling of closely held national identity with the hard power interests of states, in 
areas such as economics and national security, presents a major roadblock for cooperative 
processes. Essentially, the blending of these two ideas creates zones of untouchable policy areas, 
where it is difficult to foster communal inclinations within the domestic political space of states. 
However, these zones are not spontaneously generated within states or communities; instead they 
grow over time from the interactions between the national identity of a state and the habits states 
develop within the international community. Therefore, in order to understand how the Arctic 
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Council has failed to create significant inroads to foster cooperation on a broad spectrum of 
issues it is important to understand how these untouchable zones are generated within Russia and 
Canada.  
In the case of Russia and Canada in the Arctic, the primary driver of the generation of 
untouchable zones is a combination of the desire for a reward in capability and a strong national 
identity related to attaining such capabilities. Fundamentally, this power seeking behavior 
inhibits the ability of policies identified by the national identity of the state and enshrined in the 
policies of the state to be able to be shifted by organizations. For the Arctic region, such 
untouchable areas have emerged due to the reduction in sea-ice and the increasing fungibility of 
power in the region.  The inclusion of the ability to act upon these emerging national interests 
fueled by nationalistic rhetoric on these key states cultivates a desire to stick to their policy guns 
on those same interests.  
Thus, for the states in the Arctic Council who now have the ability to act upon their 
interests in a region they once could not these policy avenues have now opened. Policies related 
to economic development, trade route monitoring, Arctic securitization, and resource extraction 
all intensified with the introduction of fungibility in both Canada and Russia, quickly becoming 
untouchable and more entrenched by the state as the international community to look more 
promisingly upon the Arctic.299 The construction of new Arctic military capabilities with the 
objective of monitoring and securing coastal trade routes alongside agreements to resolve 
territorial disputes bilaterally signal to other states and domestic populations the overall national 
interests of the state are being taken to heart and will not be encroached upon. It is important to 
note such signaling is occurring within the Arctic waters of every coastal Arctic state and is 
                                                      




reminiscent of a developing security dilemma in the region, though it is far removed from being 
an arms race as argued by media outlets.300  
The development of hardline areas of untouchable policies poses a problem for the 
inclusion of broader policies proposed or implied by the Arctic Council. The imposition of 
barriers on certain issues for the Arctic Council is not an important issue, as the organization was 
founded primarily to serve as a regional forum and cooperative scientific framework. Rather, it 
inhibits the future growth of the Arctic Council into a true regional forum capable of addressing 
every issue within the region while simultaneously reinforcing the nationalistic push towards 
certain policy areas seeped in power politics. As the region warms it becomes increasingly 
apparent several important issues within the region will become untouchable areas due to their 
strong linkages to the national identity of its members.  
Arctic Normalization and Its Impacts 
 Due to its inaccessibility and frigid environment, the Arctic developed its own policy 
dynamics and interactive norms in part built off of the other interactions between Arctic states 
outside of the region. This is most clearly observed in the policies outlined by Gorbachev in 
Murmansk touched upon the Arctic as a unique realm for positive interaction between the Soviet 
Union and the United States.301 In this sense, the Arctic cultivated a unique set of policy habits 
on the part of the states of its region which at times seem paradoxical, for instance the 
cooperation of climate issues and research sharing by states historically diametrically opposed to 
one another. Yet, the Arctic Council did not spring fully formed from the head of Zeus, it was 
instead the product of a long list of cooperative agreements on the part of every member of the 
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Council with the other members and those relationships formed the basis of habit for Arctic 
policies.302 Yes, most of the ongoing Arctic territorial disputes were not resolved heading into 
1996’s Ottawa Declaration, but the lack of resolution of maritime exclusive economic zones did 
not impact the Council’s formation or central goal.303 The development of several other 
international institutions which would go on to partner with the Council on its objectives related 
to cooperation and environmental study is a testament to the uniqueness of the politics of the 
Arctic, and the Council members ability to form cooperative habits with one another on 
communal issues.  
However, the introduction of sweeping changes in the Arctic environment related to the 
reduction of inaccessibility and environmental challenges represents a transformation for the 
interactive habits of the Arctic states. Essentially, the inability to act on territorial disputes due to 
high costs of Arctic operations and general inaccessibility decreased both the fungibility of 
power within the region and international interests within the region. These two factors decrease 
on a year to year basis as the Arctic’s sea ice declines, thereby resolving the question of 
fungibility and increasing international interests within the Arctic region. Thus the easing costs 
of access to the Arctic are serving to alter the fundamental habits which have historically defined 
interactions within the Arctic region.  
While the creation of these untouchable policy zones is closely tied to the national 
identity of the state, the reasoning they are pursued on the governmental level stems from the 
overall national interests of the government. In the case of Russia for instance, the creation of 
untouchable zones related to its militarization and oil extraction efforts in the Barents Sea are 
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closely linked to the desire of the state and populace to return to great power status.304 
Meanwhile, in the case of Canadian untouchable zone creation related to disagreements 
regarding the nature of the Northwest Passage are much more closely associated with feelings of 
the exploitation of Canadian national sovereignty.305 These feelings from these states create 
bulwarks which make it difficult for the Arctic Council to effect changes within those states to be 
more community oriented, therefore enabling the encroachment of outer-Arctic habits into Arctic 
spaces and leading to a normalization of Arctic relationships.  
The transformative effects of normalization on the established habits of interaction 
among the states of the Arctic region since 1989 have been profound in some areas and more 
measured in others. Over the past thirty years those habits most affected by normalization have 
been challenged and replaced by new habits of interaction framed by the national identities, 
characteristics, and histories of the states calling the Arctic region home. This leads to the 
following fours implications regarding the Arctic Council and its institutional effectiveness in the 
face of resurgent national identity in a more traversable Arctic; the fungibility of security, habit-
forming of scientific cooperation, the resource-driven Arctic, and the mythic routes.  
Fungibility of Security  
As a space for the military operations, the Arctic has only been amenable to ballistic 
submarines, monitoring stations, and coast guard operations. However, these habits of limited 
military operation are changing as Arctic sea ice shrinks and its thickness lessens. As evident in 
the case studies of both Russia and Canada, the operational space in the Arctic is opening wider 
with every passing year and this will only continue given the projected temperature increases in 
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the region.306 Initially, the habits of the states surrounding the Arctic Ocean in the early years of 
the Arctic Council continued to view the Arctic as a strategic space similar to how it was 
approached during the Cold War. This meant that the Arctic was used for the stationing of 
ballistic submarines and other small scale military support activity due to the prevailing 
conditions of significant ice cover making it nearly impossible or costly for other, traditional 
military operations.307 The ice sheet further reinforced the costliness of Arctic operations as it 
required specialized military equipment to be stationed within the region, further increasing the 
costs of Arctic operations and training. However, as the ice sheet has receded the prevailing 
habits of Arctic interaction in the 20th century are becoming progressively less applicable. 
Rather than creating a new status quo based upon the unique interactions and intense 
national identities within the Arctic region though, this has caused a slow spread of extra-Arctic 
behaviors to filter into the interactive habits of states in the region. For example, though Russia 
possesses the most capable and largest Arctic military forces in the Northern Fleet, the 
renovations and expansion of the Northern Fleet can be pointed to as part of the general military 
modernization programs Russia has pursued in recent years.308 The fact these forces are capable 
in projecting Russian authority into territory currently embroiled in disputes and protecting the 
Northeast Passage is propagating traditional security dilemma and trade security spirals normally 
observed outside of the Arctic region.309 This build-up of forces on the northernmost coast of 
Russia has served as the justification of similar strengthening of Arctic military capabilities by 
the Danish, Norwegian, Canadian, and US militaries.310 The purchasing of new military 
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hardware for Arctic operations represents the ongoing force of habits from interacting with other 
states where power is much more fungible than it is in the Arctic Ocean.  
A common thread of the ongoing normalization of militarization is that it has come on in 
waves precipitated by the publication of major Arctic climate reports published by the Arctic 
Council and its working groups. Yet, it is important to note the states in the Arctic region are not 
the only states cultivating interests within the Arctic. Over the past 30 years, several states 
including China, India, and Singapore have begun to develop interests in the Arctic region for 
the very same reason the Arctic states have, as a consequence they have joined the Arctic 
Council as observer states.311 Alongside these actions though, some states have begun to prepare 
their militaries for Arctic action or declared the Arctic to be critical to their national interests in 
the future, such as China’s declaration of constructing a Polar Silk Road across the Northeast 
Passage to access European markets and the development of a small fleet of Chinese 
Icebreakers.312 In short, several states from around the globe are beginning to interact within the 
Arctic region; thereby, making it increasingly akin to non-Arctic regions where national 
identities are present and tempered by institutional effectiveness, mutual dependence, and clever 
statesmanship. The clearest current example of such behavior has been the years following the 
2014 Ukrainian Crisis.  Russian action was met with punitive measures from the West in the 
form of boycotts from Canada and the United States in line with how the West habitual interacts 
with these kinds of operations.313 Later, sanctions were also applied to Russia as well, yet the 
complexities of the relationship between the Arctic states in the Arctic generated cooperation on 
critical areas for the Arctic region.314  
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In sum, as the Arctic has warmed over the past 30 years it has been ever easier for the 
states interested in the region to operationalize their interests. As the case studies have shown 
though, the transformative effects of increasing fungibility has only precipitated normalization in 
line with other areas of the world in which these states interact, thereby enabling those habits to 
begin to intrude on the relationships in the Arctic. Coupled with the increasing nationalistic 
rhetoric and continued ice decline it is clear as the region becomes increasingly normalized the 
Arctic will shift from a realm of friendly cooperation into a zone of competition similar to other 
regions of the world where the competing interests of powerful states collide. 
Habitual Scientific Cooperation 
The Arctic Council was born from the desire to share scientific resources in order to gain 
a better idea about a fragile environment. Over the past 30 years, this scientific cooperation has 
remained steadfast in its approach to the region for both of the member states examined in the 
case studies. Given the most recent successes of the conservation cooperation in the fall of 2018, 
it stands to reason that a new habit for interaction has developed between the Arctic states related 
to the Arctic environment. The formation of the habit of scientific cooperation is strongly linked 
to the national identities discussed for both Canada and Russia, and scientific cooperation may 
be the most robust area of traditional Arctic policy in the face of ongoing regional normalization. 
Though for differing reasons, scientific cooperation has remained popular among all of 
the members of the Arctic Council, continually leading to improvements within the international 
community regarding scientific study of the climate and conservation of unique ecosystems. 
Since the founding of the Arctic Council the levels of scientific cooperation have increased 




have taken place in order to assist in preserving the Arctic environ.315 It has been the research of 
these endeavors, funded by a conglomerate of nations, which produce the research indicating the 
shrinking of Arctic ice cover and the need of further action related to conservation, 
environmentalism, and regional stewardship.  
The national identities of both Russia and Canada in broad congruence with Arctic 
Council objectives on conservation in light of ongoing study into the changing Arctic clime, as 
the publication of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment in 2004 served to jumpstart several 
domestic programs related to environmental conservation in the fragile Arctic environment. In 
Russia’s case the cultivation of new environmental laws, legal regimes, and standards pushed 
forward state-wide, but a great deal of focus to the Arctic was placed on the Arctic in terms of 
fisheries management in the immediate aftermath of the publication of the Assessment.316 For 
Canada, the Assessment served to push forward an overhaul of the primary environmental 
protection laws and extend Arctic protected areas.317 In this sense, the immediate realization of 
shrinking ice sheets prompted a response from state governments to do a more efficient job in 
conserving their local environments in line with communal objectives and previously developed 
habits.  
Given the thirty years of scientific cooperation it stands to reason as ice levels continue to 
decline the commitment of the Arctic states to study and conserve the Arctic environment will 
either remain steady or increase to meet the challenge. As mentioned previously, the adoption of 
the Polar Code by the International Maritime Organization, the continued strengthening of the 
environmental laws of Canada and Russia, and the establishment of legally binding resolutions 
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like the aforementioned 2018 Agreement To Prevent Unregulated Commercial Fishing on the 
High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean by Arctic Council members have all been predicated by 
the actions, research, and coordination offered by Arctic Council members and the working 
groups funded by members.318 The persistence of this habit in the face of competing national 
goals of Arctic Council members has been due to the congruence of national identity related to 
cooperation and conservation efforts within Russia and Canada to broader Arctic Council 
objectives. Therefore, it stands to reason as the Arctic continues to warm in the midst of climate 
change, so too will the commitment of the states of the Arctic Council to studying and 
responding to such changes even if the encroachment of normalization deteriorates other 
cooperative opportunities. 
The Resource-Driven Arctic  
The Arctic has been known to possess a significant amount of reserves of oil and natural 
gas capable of enriching the state and investors funding such operations. Thus, the Arctic has 
grown to in importance for these resources as it has become less costly to operate in the Arctic 
region.319 Importantly though, the intersection of oil extraction and the status of the Arctic as a 
realm most readily conceptualized as environmentally fragile leaves commercial efforts to 
extract such resources in an interesting position especially in conjunction with ongoing Arctic 
normalization.  
Historically, there was a significant level of interest in the extraction of oil and natural 
gas resources from the Arctic Circle, and this effort to extract resources from the region has been 
simmering on the backburner of several states for years. Interest in this kind of develop existed 
from a governmental perspective in Russia as early as Gorbachev’s Murmansk declaration and 
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Canada has continually pursued policies along similar lines related to approaching the Arctic as 
an area for economic exploitation.320 What has prevented the large scale development of oil 
extraction facilities has been a combination of the costs of operation, the technological 
developments necessary to extract oil from the Arctic Ocean, and the inability to have oil tanks 
travel through the Arctic Ocean. Despite these impediments, interest in gaining power and 
influence from the extraction of Arctic natural resources fueled discussions within the capitols of 
Arctic states, oftentimes outweighing environmental concerns or being tempered by other 
environmental legislation or studies from the Arctic Council.321   
As previously mentioned, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment of 2004 made waves 
within the international community, because of the interest generated related to the extraction of 
offshore oil and natural gas deposits in the region. Essentially, the Assessment proposed the 
continuing warming of the Arctic Ocean would reduce costs of operation over time for the 
companies willing to extract the resources in the region.322 This sparked a host of government 
sponsored or greenlit programs to hunt for oil in the Arctic Ocean from nearly every state with 
Arctic coastlines; however, the most significant of these programs would be in Russia’s 
extraction efforts in the Barents Sea.323As previously, Rosneft’s Arctic Oil extraction sites have 
garnered a great deal of international disdain and condemnation from environmental groups, yet 
instead of developing a truly untouchable area for the Arctic Council given these strong national 
interests there were considerations regarding marine oil pollution which were utilized in regards 
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to the extraction of raw resources.324 Therefore as the deterrents for states to extract Arctic oil 
melts away it becomes increasingly normalized to attempt to extract such oil despite the 
confrontation of condemnation along environmental grounds. 
As the Arctic continues to warm, it becomes increasingly probable for the states 
surrounding the region to continue to weigh the costs and benefits in favor of extracting Arctic 
Oil. With the decline of the unique environmental barriers and the resurgence of national 
interests related to exploiting the Arctic Ocean’s resources, it stands to reason such extraction 
attempts will continue despite international condemnation from environmental organizations. In 
the case of Russia’s Arctic oil extraction, the only reason its plans for expansion have slowed 
have been from the sanctions related to the Ukrainian Crisis limiting investments and 
technological assistance from Western firms like Exxon-Mobile.325 Therefore, as the ease of 
access in the region grows so too will it become increasingly normalized in relation to the 
extraction of oil, and the effects of other areas of global interaction among Arctic States. 
As the Arctic continues down its path of normalization and ever-increasing access, the 
desire for oil companies to exploit Arctic resources will likely only continue to grow. Though at 
odds with other critical areas of national identity for the coastal states of the Arctic, this has not 
developed into an untouchable zone for the Arctic Council, instead the Council has remained 
dedicated to preparing its members for the possibilities of oil pollution and management in the 
High North. This tacit blessing from the Arctic Council regarding oil exploration in the Arctic 
region is likely to continue, especially in regarding the amount of national interests on the line 
for Arctic Coastal States.   
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The Mythic Routes 
In the past unresolved territorial disputes have deterred investment into the Arctic region 
as investors wish to avoid being embroiled in international incidents where it is unclear.326 
Therefore, as the Arctic becomes easier to access then it becomes increasingly necessary for 
those disputes to be resolved in order to readily facilitate economic development. Given the 
impact of national identity regarding the Arctic over the past 30 years, particularly in areas like 
territorial disputes and national sovereignty, it is important to detail how emerging commercial 
interests and the habits of the states of the Arctic have meshed together as the sea ice retreats. 
There has always been some interest in the Arctic from a commercial shipping 
perspective, yet it is important to not though this interest has been dissuaded by costs of 
operating in the extreme Arctic climate.327 Nevertheless, companies and states pursued interests 
in Arctic trade routes to potentially open them for business.328 For the states themselves, the 
potential value of Arctic territory as a trading hub fuels some of the territorial disputes of the 
region, despite the difficulty of travel into and out of the region reducing the importance and 
visibility of those disputes.329  Thus, the habitual logic of almost ignoring territorial disputes 
prevailed and the region was left to its own limited economic devices because of its 
inaccessibility.  
As sea ice has melted though, the importance of the potential geographic wealth of the 
Arctic has been thrust into the limelight of international politics. The continued assessment of the 
international community of the value of the trade routes of the region has increased the interest 
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of the national governments of Canada and Russia within the region.330 Given the potential 
profits to be made for both corporations and state governments, the continued melting of the ice 
sheets of the Arctic is correlating with increased ocean travel and increased financing to support 
Arctic expeditions for corporate gains.331 Since the publication of the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment, the Russian government has done its best to help prepare vessels to traverse the 
Northeast Passage and projects significant increases in the years to come.332 Meanwhile, Canada 
has grown concerned about the national sovereignty of Canadian waterways as the Northwest 
Passage becomes increasing viable for shipping traffic.333 For both of these states, the prevailing 
habits of interaction regarding these trade routes running along their northern coastlines are 
causing those routes to achieve increasing political gravitas for the future their power and putting 
new life into ongoing territorial disputes.334 As noted within the case studies the five Arctic 
Coastal States agreed to resolve their territorial disputes bilaterally instead of multilaterally in 
2008 during the Arctic Coastal Conference.335 Thus, there is a hearty connection between the 
ongoing territorial disputes of the region and the economic interests of the states surrounding it 
which the Arctic Council has done little to address. 
The economic veracity of the Arctic region as a trade hub remains largely unknowable, 
due to the costs Arctic operations would continually incur compared to other regions even after 
significant portions of sea-ice have receded. As the ice continues to recede, interest in the region 
is likely to continue to grow which could exacerbate ongoing territorial disputes.336 As the ice 
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continues to melt, these territorial disputes could become exacerbated or serve as the means to 
provoke a ready resolution to the territorial issue in order to facilitate increased investment and 
commercial stability for states seeking to invest within the Arctic region.  
Normalization and the Future of the Arctic Council 
The future of the Arctic in the midst of normalization of Arctic relations is one 
characterized by the other aspects of the interstate relationships of Arctic states. In other words, 
it will be one defined by the already ongoing relationships present in the international 
community outside of the Arctic. The Arctic Council has always remained steadfast on its 
commitment to limiting its scope of interests to issues relevant to members and where it can 
succeed, such as conservation issues and scientific diplomacy yet there are a host of emerging 
issues where the Council may be pushed to act. 
As normalization continues to affect the relationships of Arctic states and how achievable 
the various national interests of those states, the question emerges as to what role would the 
Arctic Council have in that new Arctic. The most likely outcome is a similar role to the one it has 
now, a regional forum dedicated to heightening Arctic issues and coordinating Arctic climate, 
environmental, and conservation research. Ultimately, the fate of the Arctic Council lies with its 
member states and their interactions on the issues the Council feels are important. The 2nd 
Finnish Chairmanship’s opening statements regarding policy priorities, it is likely the ongoing 
direction of the Arctic Council will remain in cooperation on environmental concerns with a 
sprinkling of attempts to heighten the visibility of the organization.337 Put differently, Finnish 
objectives are not dissimilar from the objectives of previous Chairs including both Canada and 
Russia. Still the risk of surges of interest within the domestic politics and identity of Arctic states 
                                                      





could transform Arctic relations in to be either more confrontational or more cooperative than 
outer-Arctic relations.  
Initially, in both case studies, there was a significant amount of nationalistic pushes 
related to utilizing Arctic resources on the part of both Canada and Russia to benefit themselves 
while maintaining conservation goals related to common goods. The prioritization of national 
interests over common goods in the region, especially with the amount of speculation related to 
economic profits to be made in the region speak to the possibility of an Arctic as unstable as the 
projected sea ice cover.338 Building up military forces alongside rhetoric centered on an Arctic 
manifest destiny on the part of Arctic states with competing territorial ambitions could hold the 
potential for conflict.339 At least these build-ups of military capability could lead to a 
destabilizing effect on Arctic politics especially with the ongoing build-up of economic interests 
in the region alongside nationalistic rhetoric.340 This though, seems unlikely at the moment and 
at any point over the past 30 years of both case studies. As noted in the case studies, these build-
ups of forces have been related to overhaul programs of the national militaries of the Russian and 
Canadian militaries.341 Given these programs reflect global relationships between Russia and the 
West, it becomes likely a conflict or contention between the Arctic Coastal States is less likely 
than initially believed or considered. Moreover, the continued heighted status of the Arctic 
Council in the whole of global politics with its expanding observer status and rotating 
chairmanship pushes a cooperative purgative onto the members of the Council, enabling a 
discussion of important Arctic objectives on a two year basis involving top ministers from Arctic 
states. This reinforces the possibility of a normalization of the Arctic space relative to what it has 
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experienced in the past which will not lead to an international conflict or new Cold War, because 
those things have not happened since 1989 in the whole of global politics.  
On the other end of the spectrum in terms of possible futures for the Arctic and the Arctic 
Council is the possibility of a new set of cooperative opportunities for the region because of the 
long history of cooperation among members of the Council. As evident in the case studies 
though, this cooperation with other Council members is often relegated to one specific set of 
issue areas which excludes significant parts of the national interests of states.342 Furthermore, 
domestic pressures can force the hands of states to behave in certain ways regarding the Arctic, 
from Harper’s statements to protecting Arctic Sovereignty to declarations of the Arctic being the 
means to superpower status by Medvedev, thus limiting the cooperative impacts of the Arctic 
Council.343 Essentially, there are too many factors pointing to cooperation on some issues while 
competition and disagreement prevails in other areas. In essence, what is likely to occur as the 
region warms and becomes more accommodating to travel is the transference of habits from 
outside of the Arctic, into Arctic politics. For the Arctic Council this bodes rather well, as 
cooperation based on environmental factors is  popular among its members, and those same 
members do not hesitate to engage one another on issues it declares are outside of its jurisdiction, 
such as territorial disputes. Thus, while cooperation will persist on issues like conservation, 
climate study, pollution management, and search and rescue operations it is unlikely such 
cooperation will become the hallmark of every Arctic issue into the future.  
With this in mind, the only real option for continued success for the Arctic Council is to 
stick to its most successful cooperative programs related to conservation and scientific 
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cooperation; thereby, leaving other areas more closely linked to national interests untouched.344 
Thus, the future of the Arctic Council likely looks very similar to the present and immediate past 
of the Arctic Council, the facilitation of cooperation on certain issues and the ongoing avoidance 
of issues which could cause cooperation to breakdown.  
  
                                                      






Over the past 30 years, the Arctic Council has proven itself to be an institution focused 
on developing a community of environmentally conscious states working together in order to 
better study and preserve one of the most fragile and unique ecosystems on the planet. To this 
end, the Arctic Council has successfully enabled countless opportunities of research coordination 
across its eight member states, indigenous people’s organizations, observer institutions, and 
observer states leading to new international norms related to environmental protection within the 
Arctic Ocean.345 The success of these objectives is astounding, and as the case studies regarding 
Canadian and Russian policies go to show, likely linked to overall inclinations of the national 
identities of the states participating within the Arctic Council.  
 Yet, national identity also plays a role in limiting the cooperative pushes of the Arctic 
Council, holding it back from being a full regional forum to discuss broad spectrum issues within 
the region which appear to be becoming increasingly relevant. The encroachment of relations 
from outside of the Arctic region perhaps will be able to increasingly normalize the region as the 
overall fungibility of national power increases in correlation to the decreases of ice-sheet 
thickness. Regardless of how the Arctic will be transformed, it is clear since 1989 the Arctic 
Council has had its successes be based upon the national identity and interests of its members 
just as it has had its limitations imposed upon it by those same forces.  
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